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ARTICLE
TERRORISM AND ASYLUM SEEKERS:
WHY THE REAL ID ACT IS A FALSE PROMISE
Marisa Silenzi Cianciarulo
The Real ID Act, passed on May 11, 2005, is the first post–September 11 
antiterrorism legislation specifically to target a group of vulnerable 
individuals to whom the United States has historically granted protection: 
asylum seekers. The passage of the Real ID Act led asylum advocates to 
wring their hands in despair and immigration restrictionists to clap their 
hands in glee. This Article argues that both sides of the debate may have been 
justified in their reactions, but not because of the immediate chilling impact 
on asylum that they seem to expect. With regard to requirements for 
establishing asylum eligibility, the Real ID Act, rather than imposing new, 
onerous restrictions on asylum, codifies case law upon which adjudicators, 
advocates, and government attorneys have been relying for decades. 
However, several areas of poor drafting, combined with legislative history 
mischaracterizing the asylum system as a haven for terrorists and suicide 
bombers, may result in the denial of bona fide asylum applications. This 
Article provides concrete guidance for adjudicators, advocates, and 
government attorneys applying the Real ID Act to asylum cases. It examines 
the case law upon which some of the provisions are based and offers 
interpretations for unclear provisions. Overall, this Article emphasizes that it 
is the duty of adjudicators, advocates, and government attorneys to protect 
victims of persecution.
I. Overview
The United States’ asylum system has emerged as a new battleground in 
the “War on Terror.” On May 11, 2005, Congress passed the Real ID 
Act,1 purported antiterrorism legislation specifically targeting asylum 
seekers, a group of vulnerable non-citizens fleeing persecution to which 
the United States has historically offered protection. The purpose of the 
Real ID Act’s asylum provisions,2 according to its author, House 
Judiciary Committee Chairman James Sensenbrenner (R-Wis.), is to 
prevent 
terrorists from using the U.S. asylum system to gain lawful immigration 
status in the United States:
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1 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, 
and Tsunami Relief, Pub. L. No. 109-13, Div. B, 119 Stat. 231, 302–23 (2005) [Real ID Act].
2 The Real ID Act addresses other immigration issues, including withholding of 
removal, judicial review, border security, and driver’s license issuance. See id., §§ 1(b), 
102(c)(2), 102, 201. These provisions are beyond the scope of this Article.
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There is no one who is lying through their teeth that should be 
able to get relief from the courts, and I would just point out that 
this bill would give immigration judges the tool to get at the Blind 
Sheikh who wanted to blow up landmarks in New York, the man 
who plotted and executed the bombing of the World Trade 
Center in New York, the man who shot up the entrance to the 
CIA headquarters in northern Virginia, and the man who shot up 
the El Al counter at Los Angeles International Airport. Every 
one of these non–9/11 terrorists who tried to kill or did kill 
honest, law-abiding Americans was an asylum applicant. We ought 
to give our judges the opportunity to tell these people no and to 
pass the bill.3
Unfortunately, the law has far more potential to undermine the legitimate 
goals of the asylum system than it does to strengthen national security.
The fact that Chairman Sensenbrenner targeted non-citizens for 
antiterrorism legislation is neither surprising nor uncommon. The 
magnitude of the September 11 terrorist attacks has clouded the fact that 
they were not the first incidents of terrorism on U.S. soil. According to 
the USA PATRIOT Act,4 terrorism consists of criminal “acts dangerous to 
human life” intended “to influence the policy of a government by 
intimidation or coercion.”5 Based on this definition, several acts of 
terrorism occurred in the years leading up to the September 11 attacks. 
One such act occurred on a date already somewhat faded from the 
collective U.S. memory: April 19, 1995. On that day, Timothy McVeigh 
bombed the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, 
killing 168 people, including 19 children, and injuring more than 500 
others.6 Before the Oklahoma City bombing, the Unabomber killed three 
people and maimed twenty-nine others over a period of seventeen years.7
Terrorist Eric Rudolph evaded law enforcement for several years before 
being arrested, tried and convicted for deadly bombings at multiple
abortion clinics and the 1996 Summer Olympics in Atlanta.8 Political or 
religious ideology motivated the perpetrators of all of these acts of 
domestic terrorism. None of them was an asylum seeker; indeed, each 
was a U.S. citizen.While target ng non-citizens as potential terrorists is commonplace, the 
Real ID Act is unusual in that it illogically focuses on shoring up an 
asylum system that already was a difficult and unattractive means of 
gaining legal status in the United States.9 The Act squarely targets the 
3 151 Cong. Rec. H460 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 2005) (statement of Chairman 
Sensenbrenner). See also H.R. Rep. No. 109-72, at H2868 (May 3, 2005) (referencing 
Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman (“Blind Sheikh”), Ramzi Yousef (1993 World Trade Center 
bombing), Ahmad Ajaj (1993 World Trade Center bombing), Mir Aimal Kansi (CIA 
attack), and Hesham Mohamed Ali Hedayet (El Al Airlines murder)).
4 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) 
[PATRIOT Act].
5 Id. § 802(a)(4) (amending 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331(A) and 2331(B)(ii) (2000)).
6 Serge F. Kovaleski, Oklahoma Tries to Get Past the Pain; Rebuilding Is the Easier 
Part of Recovering from April Bombing, Wash. Post, Aug. 10, 1995, at A1.
7 George F. Will, Sanity and the Unabomber, Wash. Post, Jan. 8, 1998, at A21.
8 Jay Reeves, Clinic Bomber Gets 2 Life Sentences: Rudolph is Unrepentant, Says 
Abortion Must Be Fought “With Deadly Force,” Wash. Post, July 19, 2005, at A5.
9 See infra Part III (discussing the current asylum system, including significant changes 
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well-fortified asylum process while ignoring the myriad other, more 
likely immigration routes available to non-citizens seeking to harm the 
United States, including over twenty types of non-immigrant visas,10
several of which were utilized by the September 11 hijackers.11
Moreover, application of the Real ID Act’s asylum provisions is not 
limited to asylum seekers who may match the profile of a terrorist.12 It 
instead affects all asylum seekers, including those fleeing female genital 
mutilation, domestic violence, religious persecution, politically based 
persecution, genocide, and ethnic cleansing. Thus, the Real ID Act has 
the potential to have a severely negative impact on the U.S. asylum 
system by making acquisition of asylum even more difficult for those 
who need it most.
As mentioned above, the modus operandi of this legislation is not novel. 
Examples abound of imprudent anti-terrorism efforts implemented since 
September 11, purporting to prevent terrorism but in reality only serving 
the interests of immigration restrictionists. The controversial National 
Security Exit Entry Registration System (hereinafter NSEERS) required 
non-citizens from certain countries, all of which were Arab or Muslim, to 
register with immigration authorities. This initiative led to thousands of 
detentions and deportations for immigration violations, but to no 
terrorism-related convictions.13 A “voluntary interview” program 
launched within a month of the September 11 attacks had federal law 
enforcement agents interviewing thousands of male nationals of Arab and 
Muslim countries, but did not turn up any significant reported leads in 
the terrorism investigation.14 In perhaps the most misguided post–
September 11 action prior to the passage of the Real ID Act, the Bush 
Administration suspended refugee resettlement, stranding thousands of 
refugees in dangerous, disease-ridden refugee camps, even though none 
of the September 11 terrorists (or any terrorist in U.S. history) entered 
made in 1996).
10 See 8 U.S.C § 1101(a)(15) (2000) (setting forth the nonimmigrant visas available to 
eligible non-citizens); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(26) (2000) (defining the term 
“nonimmigrant visa”).
11 See Thomas R. Eldridge et al., 9/11 and Terrorist Travel: Staff Report of the National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States 7–31 (2004) (detailing each of the 
September 11 hijackers’ visa application processes and encounters with U.S. immigration 
personnel) [hereinafter 9/11 and Terrorist Travel]. Most of the hijackers applied for and 
received tourist visas. See id. One applied for and received a student visa after being 
denied a tourist visa. See id. at 13–14.
12 See Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231, 302–23 (2005).
13 Leadership Conference on Civil Rights Educational Fund & American Bar 
Association Commission on Immigration, American Justice Through Immigrants’ Eyes
107 (2004) [hereinafter American Justice Through Immigrants’ Eyes]. The government 
claimed to have gained significant leads in the terrorism investigation but declined to 
provide any information to the public. See id. See also Dalia Hashad, Stolen Freedoms: 
Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians in the Wake of Post 9/11 Backlash, 81 Denv. U. L. Rev.
735, 743–44 (2004) (discussing the shortcomings of NSEERS).
14 See Susan M. Akram & Maritza Karmely, Immigration and Constitutional 
Consequences of Post-9/11 Policies Involving Arabs and Muslims in the United States: Is 
Alienage a Distinction Without a Difference?, 38 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 609, 628–29 (2005) 
(describing the “voluntary interview” program launched by the Bush Administration); see 
also American Justice Through Immigrants’ Eyes, supra note Error! Bookmark not 
defined., at 104 (pointing out that the “voluntary interviews” coincided with a massive law 
enforcement sweep in which over 1,000 nationals of Arab and Muslim countries were 
arrested for immigration violations).
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the country through the refugee resettlement program.15 While these 
measures may have served to provide a sense of security to non-Arab, 
non-Muslim U.S. citizens, they achieved no apparent or disclosed 
progress in the War on Terror.
The Real ID Act operates by taking advantage of several prevalent, 
xenophobic misconceptions held in U.S. society—that all non-citizens 
are potential terrorists, that an application for asylum is a free and easy 
pass into the United States, and that U.S. law does not give immigration 
officials sufficient authority to remove unwanted non-citizens from the 
country—to pass a restrictionist immigration law that does nothing to 
strengthen the asylum system against terrorism. Even the name of the 
Act’s section dealing with asylum, “Preventing Terrorists from Obtaining 
Relief from Removal,”16 is testament to its alarmist agenda. Amidst that 
alarmism, several salient facts are obscured. For example, on average, 
less than thirty percent of asylum claims prevail.17 Moreover, applicants 
found to have fabricated asylum claims are banished for life from the 
United States.18 Also, all of the terrorists’ applications that Chairman 
Sensenbrenner mentions as evidence of a faulty asylum system19 were 
submitted prior to the implementation of stricter asylum provisions 
contained in the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act of 199620 and were denied even under the less strict 
provisions in place at the time.21
In addition, Chairman Sensenbrenner’s ill-advised attempt to prevent 
terrorism at first glance appears merely to codify existing case law 
governing asylum claims.22 A closer reading of the Board of Immigration 
15 See generally, Marisa S. Cianciarulo, The W Visa: A Legislative Proposal for 
Female and Child Refugees Trapped in a Post-9/11 World, 17 Yale J.L. & Feminism
(forthcoming Fall 2005) (discussing the suspension of the U.S. refugee resettlement 
program in the wake of September 11).
16 Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 101, 119 Stat. 231, 302 (2005).
17 See Dept. of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics, 2003 Yearbook of 
Immigration Statistics 56 (2004) (reporting that between 1973 and 2003, the U.S. 
government approved twenty-eight percent of asylum applications) [hereinafter 2003 
Yearbook].18 See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(6) (2000); 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.3(c)(5), 1208.3(c)(5) (2005). 
Terrorists and persons deemed to be a threat to national security are also barred from 
asylum eligibility. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(iv)–(v) (2000).
19 See supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. and accompanying text.
20 Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C, 
110 Stat. 3009, 3009-546–3009-724 (1996). See also 9/11 and Terrorist Travel, supra note 
Error! Bookmark not defined., at 47–48 (reporting that World Trade Center bombing 
perpetrators Ramzi Yousef and Ahmad Ajaj applied for asylum in 1992); id. at 51 (stating 
that Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman filed an application for asylum on Aug. 27, 1992); id. at 
215 (stating that Mir Aimal Kansi applied for asylum on Feb. 7, 1992); id. at 230 
(reporting that Hesham Mohamed Ali Hedayet applied for asylum on Dec. 1, 1992).
21 See id. at 51 (stating that an immigration judge denied Rahman’s asylum application 
on Mar. 16, 1993); id. at 48 (reporting that Ajaj’s asylum request was denied on Apr. 24, 
1993 and that Yousef’s application was never adjudicated because he was convicted of 
carrying out the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and sentenced to 240 years in prison); 
id. at 215 (reporting that Kansi’s asylum application was denied); id. at 230 (stating that on 
Mar. 7, 1995, the INS issued a Notice of Intent to Deny Hedayet’s asylum application and 
that Hedayet failed to respond to the notice within thirty days, resulting in the initiation of 
deportation proceedings against him).
22 Compare, e.g., Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 101(a)(3)(B)(ii), 119 Stat. 231, 303 (2005) 
(“Where the trier of fact determines that the applicant should provide evidence that 
corroborates otherwise credible testimony, such evidence must be provided unless the 
applicant does not have the evidence and cannot reasonably obtain the evidence.”) with 
Matter of S-M-J-, 21 I&N Dec. 722, 725 (B.I.A. 1997).
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Appeals and Circuit Courts of Appeals cases from which the Real ID Act 
draws, however, demonstrates subtle but nonetheless significant 
differences between the language of the Real ID Act and that of the cases 
that influenced it.23 Where those cases are thoughtful and thoroughly 
reasoned, the Real ID Act is careless and rash.24 Moreover, the previous 
case law approach allowed for individualized interpretation and 
evolution of asylum law, whereas the Real ID Act, as a statute, is far 
more rigid. Improper interpretation of the Real ID Act’s language may 
have devastating consequences for bona fide asylum applicants while 
providing no additional protection against fraudulent claims.
This Article provides guidance for asylum adjudicators charged with the 
daunting task of interpreting the Real ID Act. Part II briefly explores the 
history of U.S. refugee law, from World War II, and the subsequent 1968 
ratification of the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees,25 to 
the Refugee Act of 1980.26 Part III describes pre-Real ID Act statutory 
restrictions on asylum and discusses the passage of the Real ID Act itself. 
Part IV analyzes each asylum provision of the Real ID Act in terms of 
relevant jurisprudence and regulations and suggests how each provision 
should be interpreted. This Article concludes that asylum adjudicators 
have a duty to interpret the Real ID Act in the spirit of the humanitarian 
treaties and laws upon which the asylum system is based.
II. U.S. Asylum and Refugee Law: 1939–1980
A. Fleeing Religious Persecution: the Tragedy of the S.S. St. Louis
The United States has a long history of protecting individuals who are 
fleeing persecution. The country itself was founded as a shelter from
religious persecution, and quickly became home to Quakers, Puritans, 
Catholics, Huguenots, and other religious denominations unwelcome in 
seventeenth and eighteenth-century Europe.27 That tradition of sanctuary 
has survived several periods of intense xenophobia, racially based 
exclusionary policies, national security threats, and war.
This history of refugee protection, however, is not unblemished. One of 
the country’s most egregious failures to protect persons fleeing religious 
and ethnic persecution occurred on June 6, 1939. On that date, the 
23 See generally Part IV infra.
24 Compare, e.g., § 101(a)(3)(B)(ii), 119 Stat. at 303 (failing to impose a 
“reasonableness” requirement) with Secaida-Rosales v. INS, 331 F.3d 297, 311 (2d Cir. 
2003) (vacating a denial of asylum where, inter alia, the judge’s demands for corroboration 
of testimony were unreasonable), Georgis v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 962, 969 (7th Cir. 2003) 
(same), and Senathirajah v. INS, 157 F.3d 210, 216 (3d Cir. 1998) (vacating a denial of 
withholding where the judge’s demands for corroboration were unreasonable in light of the 
validity of applicant’s testimony).
25 Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter 1967 Protocol].
26 Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 8 U.S.C.) [Refugee Act].
27 See International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, 22 U.S.C. § 6401(a)(1) (2000) 
(noting that “[m]any of our Nation’s founders ºed religious persecution abroad, cherishing 
in their hearts and minds the ideal of religious freedom”); William Carlson Smith, 
Americans in the Making: The Natural History of the Assimilation of Immigrants 4 
(Edward Alsworth Ross ed., 1939) (noting that the United States was “vaunted as a land 
not only of economic opportunity but also of religious freedom”). See generally Roger 
Daniels, Coming to America: A History of Immigration and Ethnicity in American Life 94 
(1990).
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German transatlantic liner St. Louis was forced to return to Europe, its 
937 passengers having been denied entry to the United States. Most of 
them were European Jews fleeing Nazi persecution.28
At the time, the United States did not have laws specifically permitting 
refugee admissions. Immigration occurred primarily through a 
nationality-based quota system; when the allotted number of visas ran 
out for a particular country or region, applicants had to wait until a visa
became available in order to immigrate.29 At the time of the St. Louis’s 
voyage, the German-Austrian quota had not only been filled but had a 
waiting list of several years.30 Entry to the United States would have 
required an executive order from President Roosevelt, who declined to 
issue one.31While the St. Louis made its way back to Europe, Jewish organizations 
secured admission for most of the refugees to western European 
countries. The passengers eventually settled in Belgium, France, Great 
Britain, and the Netherlands to await their turn to enter the United 
States.32 Approximately four months after the St. Louis’s return to 
Europe, World War II began. With the exception of Great Britain, all of 
the countries to which the St. Louis passengers were sent subsequently 
came under Nazi control. Many of the St. Louis’s passengers were forced 
into hiding, driven into Nazi labor camps, or killed in the Holocaust.33
B. The 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees
In the aftermath of the Nazi atrocities of World War II, refugee protection 
gained prominence in the international community. The United Nations 
General Assembly promulgated the Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees in 195134 specifically to provide protection to refugees 
displaced as a result of World War II.
The United States, however, did not ratify the 1951 Convention, instead 
choosing to reformulate an independent asylum policy in the 
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952.35 Under the 1952 Act, the 
Attorney General was given authorization “to withhold the deportation of 
any alien within the United States to any country in which in his opinion 
the alien would be subject to physical persecution and for such period of 
time as he deems to be necessary for such reason.”36
Refugees gained a more formal immigration status when Congress 
28 United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Voyage of the “St. Louis,” http://www. 
ushmm.org/wlc/en/index.php?ModuleId=10005267 (last visited Nov. 19, 2005) 
[hereinafter Voyage of the “St. Louis”]. The refugees were originally en route to Cuba, but 
the Cuban government revoked their landing passes and denied them entry. Id.
29 Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, 43 Stat. 153, 159–65, repealed by Immigration 
and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, tit. IV, § 403(a)(23), 66 Stat. 163, 279.
30 Voyage of the “St. Louis,” supra note Error! Reference source not found.Error! 
Bookmark not defined..
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Wartime Fate of the Passengers of the 
“St. Louis,” http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/index.php?ModuleId=10005267 (last visited 
Nov. 19, 2005).
34 July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter 1951 Convention].
35 Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952).
36 Id. at 214 (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1253 (2000)).
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amended the 1952 Act in 1965,37 but even that gesture was born largely 
of the United States’ Cold War political concerns rather than 
humanitarian interests.38 The 1965 Amendments allowed only refugees 
from either communist countries39 or countries in the “general area of the 
Middle East” to qualify for asylum.40 Asylum seekers falling within these 
narrow parameters still had to demonstrate a “clear probability” of 
persecution (a higher standard than the “reasonable possibility” standard 
that exists today) before being accepted as refugees.41 The 1965 
Amendments also retained strict numerical limitations.42
In 1967, the United Nations updated the 1951 Convention with the 
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees,43 designed to address any 
refugee flows arising out of persecution-related events after World War 
II.44 In 1968, the United States seemed to align with the international
community’s refugee policy by signing and ratifying the 1967 Protocol.45
By acceding to the 1967 Protocol, the United States agreed that “equal 
status should be enjoyed by all refugees . . . irrespective of the dateline 1 
January 1951 . . . .”46 The Protocol defined “refugee” as any person who:
[O]wing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of 
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group 
or political opinion, is outside the country of his [or her] 
nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to 
avail himself [or herself] of the protection of that country; or 
who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of 
his [or her] former habitual residence as a result of such events, 
is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.47
Yet, the United States’ assent to the 1967 Protocol did not have a 
significant effect on asylum processing. From 1968 to 1980, the United 
States continued to enforce the narrow parameters, low ceiling on 
approvals, and strict burden of proof mandated by the amended 1952 Act 
37 An Act to Amend the Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 
911, 913 (1965).
38 See Deborah E. Anker & Michael J. Posner, The Forty Year Crisis: A Legislative 
History of the Refugee Act of 1980, 19 San Diego L. Rev. 9, 13–14 (1981) (remarking that 
Congress’s exceptions to immigration policy were strictly responses to Soviet 
expansionism, and should not be viewed as humanitarian commitments).
39 See An Act to Amend the Immigration and Nationality Act § 203(a)(7) (current 
version at 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (2000)).
40 Id.
41 See, e.g., Pierre v. U.S., 547 F.2d 1281, 1289 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that the 
burden was on the asylum seeker to show that she was a refugee by a “clear probability” 
standard of proof); Kashani v. INS, 547 F.2d 376, 379 (7th Cir. 1977) (same); Cisternas-
Estay v. INS, 531 F.2d 155, 159 (3d Cir. 1976) (sustaining denial of asylum where 
applicants failed to demonstrate a “clear probability” of persecution).
42 See An Act to Amend the Immigration and Nationality Act § 203(a)(7) (current 
version at 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (2000)) (specifying that of the 170,000 visas available yearly, 
no more than six percent should be granted for asylum applicants).
43 1967 Protocol, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined..
44 See id. pmbl.
45 Id. (specifying that the Senate ratified the Protocol on Oct. 4, 1968 and the President 
signed it on Oct. 15, 1968).
46 Id. pmbl.
47 Id. art. 1, ¶ 2.
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and the courts’ interpretation of it.48
C. Refugee Act of 1980
With the Refugee Act of 1980,49 Congress for the first time passed a law 
specifically addressing refugees and asylum seekers. By enacting the 
Refugee Act, Congress sought to give “statutory meaning to our national 
commitment to human rights and humanitarian concerns.”50 The Refugee 
Act repealed the 1952 Act’s geographical and political limitations on the 
asylum process,51 explicitly adopted the 1967 Protocol’s definition of 
“refugee,”52 formulated a legal right to seek asylum in the United States,53
and lifted the numerical caps on yearly grants of asylum.54 In addition, 
the Refugee Act mandated that the Attorney General establish procedures 
for asylum processing.55
48 See Karen Musalo et al., Refugee Law and Policy: Cases and Materials 65 (1997); 
INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 429–30 (1984) (articulating the standard for eligibility for 
withholding of removal).
49 Refugee Act, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980).
50 S. Rep. No. 96-256, at 4 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 141, 144; see also 
Refugee Act, § 101(a) (“[I]t is the historic policy of the United States to respond to the 
urgent needs of persons subject to persecution in their homelands . . . .”).
51 Refugee Act, sec. 203(c)(3), § 203(a)(7), 94 Stat. 102. However, the Refugee Act 
failed to alleviate some of the political biases that had existed in asylum processing before 
1980. Between 1984 and 1990, the United States’ geopolitical concerns led to disparate 
treatment of Central American asylum applicants fleeing human rights abuses arising from 
civil wars in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua. During that time period, the United 
States granted only 2.6% and 1.8% of claims from those fleeing American-backed regimes 
in El Salvador and Guatemala, respectively, compared to 26% of the asylum requests from 
those fleeing the communist regime in Nicaragua. See Sharon S. Russell, Migration 
Patterns of U.S. Foreign Policy Interest, in Threatened Peoples, Threatened Borders 50–67 
(Michael S. Teitelbaum & Myron Weiner eds., 1995). That particular bias finally became 
known during a series of lawsuits spearheaded by the American Baptist Churches against 
the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Department of State, the Department of 
Justice, and the Attorney General. See American Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh, 760 F. 
Supp. 796 (N.D. Cal. 1991); American Baptist Churches v. Meese, 712 F. Supp. 756 (N.D. 
Cal. 1989); American Baptist Churches v. Meese, 666 F. Supp. 1358 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
These lawsuits, which challenged the government’s treatment of Salvadoran and 
Guatemalan asylum seekers and the government’s prosecution of those providing 
sanctuary to them, culminated in a 1991 settlement approved by the District Court for the 
Northern District of California, in which the Department of Justice conceded, inter alia, 
that foreign policy, governmental relations with the applicant’s country of origin, and the 
applicant’s political beliefs “are not relevant to the determination of whether an applicant 
for asylum has a well-founded fear of persecution . . . .” Thornburgh, 760 F. Supp. at 799.
52 See § 201(a) (defining a refugee as:
Any person who is outside any country of such person’s nationality or, in the case 
of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such person last 
habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and who is unable 
or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because 
of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, 
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.)
53 § 208(a) (authorizing “[a]ny alien who is physically present in the United States or 
at a land border or port of entry . . . to apply for asylum . . . .”) (emphasis added).
54 Id. (authorizing the Attorney General to grant asylum to any alien who meets the
definition of refugee, without any numerical restrictions).
55 Id. The Attorney General issued regulations in 1990 that created a professional corps 
of asylum officers; vested initial jurisdiction of affirmative asylum claims with the Office 
of Refugees, Asylum and Parole; established filing procedures for applications for asylum; 
established interview procedures; set forth eligibility requirements; and established 
procedures for granting derivative status to immediate family members. See INS Asylum 
108 Harvard Journal on Legislation  [Vol.43
The passage of the Refugee Act ushered in a new era of refugee 
protection. The Supreme Court recognized the implications of the 
Refugee Act in the groundbreaking case of INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,56
which articulated a new, lower standard of proof for asylum eligibility, 
differentiating it from that of withholding of removal.57 Asylum was no 
longer an ad hoc, marginal immigration procedure entirely subject to the 
whims of policy. Over the next twenty-five years, asylum would emerge 
as a unique, complex body of law and a lightning rod for the national 
immigration debate, forcing the country to balance traditional 
humanitarian interests against weighty national security concerns.
III. U.S. Asylum and Refugee Law: 1980–2005
A. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
By the mid-1990s, lawmakers were aware of perceived flaws in the U.S. 
asylum system. Processing delays had led to a backlog of several years,58
during which time asylum applicants could both legally remain in the 
United States and apply for immediate work authorization, renewable on 
a yearly basis until the asylum adjudication was complete.59 This 
loophole allowed economic migrants, unscrupulous individuals, or even 
potential terrorists to avoid deportation and then to abscond as their 
applications went unexamined.60
Congress finally addressed these concerns in the Illegal Immigration 
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996.61 The 1996 Act put 
into effect a number of provisions designed to curtail abuse of the asylum 
system. The most significant limitations were a one-year deadline on 
applying for asylum,62 delay in work authorization eligibility,63 prompt 
adjudication of asylum applications,64 expedited removal,65 and detention 
of asylum seekers.66 With these provisions in place, the asylum process 
has become an unlikely choice for an individual seeking an easy, low-
profile way to gain lawful immigration status.
Procedures, 8 C.F.R. § 208 (1990).
56 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
57 Id. at 430–33.
58 See News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, 
Asylum Reform: Five Years Later (Feb. 1, 2000), available at http://uscis.gov/graphics/ 
publicaffairs/newsrels/Asylum.htm [hereinafter Asylum Reform].
59 See 8 C.F.R. § 208.7 (1993).
60 See Asylum Reform, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. (“By 1993, the 
asylum system was in a crisis, having become a magnet for abuse by persons filing 
applications in order to obtain employment authorization.”).
61 Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C, 
110 Stat. 3009-546 to 3009-724 (1996).
62 § 604(a), 110 Stat. at 3009-691 (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B) (1994)). 
63 § 604(a), 110 Stat. at 3009-693 (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(2) (1994)).
64 § 604(a), 110 Stat. at 3009-694 (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(5)(A)(iii) (1994)) 
(setting the maximum time for final adjudication at 180 days after application filing).
65 § 302(a), 110 Stat. at 3009-581 (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(I)–(III) 
(1994)).
66 Id. (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV) (1994)).
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1. The One-Year Deadline
As of April 1, 1997, asylum seekers must file their applications for
asylum within one year of their entry into the United States.67 An 
applicant’s failure to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he or 
she filed within one year of entry bars the applicant from asylum 
eligibility.68 Applicants may only overcome the bar if they demonstrate 
“changed circumstances which materially affect the applicant’s eligibility 
for asylum or extraordinary circumstances relating to the delay in filing 
an application . . . .”69 The purpose of this provision is to ensure that 
individuals applying for asylum do so as the result of an urgent need for 
protection, rather than as a delay tactic to prolong an unauthorized stay in 
the United States.
2. Delay in Work Authorization Eligibility and Prompt Adjudication 
of Asylum Claims
By revoking employment authorization and mandating prompt 
adjudication of asylum claims, the 1996 Act closed another alleged 
loophole in the asylum system. The revised provision plainly states that 
“[a]n applicant for asylum is not entitled to employment authorization.”70
Congress authorized the Attorney General to provide for employment 
authorization via regulation, but stipulated that such authorization “shall 
not be granted . . . prior to 180 days after the date of filing of the 
application for asylum.”71 Therefore, because the 1996 Act also mandates 
that asylum cases be adjudicated within 180 days of receipt of 
application,72 very few asylum seekers will qualify for employment 
authorization absent a final grant of asylum.
Moreover, the regulations stipulate that “[a]ny delay requested or caused 
by the applicant shall not be counted as part of” the 180-day delay before 
eligibility for employment authorization.73 Thus, even if a denied asylum 
applicant’s appeal puts him or her beyond the typical 180-day mark, he 
or she remains ineligible for employment authorization during that 
appellate period.
3. Expedited Removal
The expedited removal provisions of the 1996 Act authorize immigration 
officers at U.S. ports of entry to expel aliens deemed inadmissible for 
failure to provide valid entry documents.74 Such removals are referred to 
67 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B) (2000).
68 Id.
69 Id. § 1158(a)(2)(D).
70 Id. § 1158(d)(2).
71 Id.
72 Id. § 1158(d)(5)(A)(iii).
73 8 C.F.R. § 208.7(a)(2) (2005).
74 See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) (2000) (stating that “the officer shall order the alien 
removed from the United States without further hearing or review”) (emphasis added); id.
§ 1182(a)(6)(C) (rendering inadmissible persons who attempt to commit fraud to enter the 
United States); id. § 1182(a)(7) (2000) (rendering inadmissible persons who attempt to 
enter the United States without a visa).
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as “expedited” because they are not subject to rehearing or review by a 
judge.75 An individual who receives an order of expedited removal is 
barred from reentering the United States for at least five years.76
Only those individuals who express a fear of returning to their home 
country receive an opportunity to avoid being summarily deported. The 
1996 Act provides that an asylum officer should interview any such 
individuals to determine whether the expressed fears are credible.77 If the 
asylum officer determines from the “credible fear” interview that the 
individual has a “significant possibility . . . [of] establish[ing] eligibility 
for asylum,”78 the individual may remain in the United States to pursue 
asylum before an immigration judge.79 If the asylum officer does not 
believe the individual has a credible fear of persecution, the individual 
may be summarily removed.80
4. Detention of Asylum Seekers
Claiming asylum at a port of entry and even establishing a credible fear 
of persecution by no means guarantees an easy entry into the United 
States. Individuals subject to expedited removal for attempting to enter 
the United States without valid documentation, including those claiming 
asylum, are subject to mandatory detention under the Act.81 The 
Department of Homeland Security usually detains “credible fear” 
interviewees in immigration detention facilities, or, more commonly, in 
county jails from which the Department rents bed space.82 Therefore, 
many applicants are forced to spend several months or even years in 
uncomfortable detention quarters, awaiting the adjudication of an asylum 
application that has less than a thirty percent chance of success.83
B. The Asylum Application Process
An asylum applicant may apply for asylum in one of two ways: 
affirmatively, by filing an application with U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services (“CIS”), or defensively, by filing with the 
immigration court as a defense in removal proceedings.84 Persons eligible 
to apply affirmatively for asylum are those who have entered the country 
lawfully or who have entered illegally but evaded detection.85 Individuals 
who request asylum upon entry to the United States, or who are 
apprehended upon entry for lack of valid entry documents, or who 
otherwise become subject to the jurisdiction of U.S. Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) may apply for asylum in front of an 
immigration judge.86
75 Id. §§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(i), 1252(a)(2)(A)(i).
76 Id. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(i).
77 Id. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii).
78 Id. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(v); 8 C.F.R. § 208.30(e)(2) (2005).
79 8 C.F.R. § 208.30(f) (2005).
80 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B) (2000).
81 Id. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV).
82 American Bar Association Commission on Immigration, Immigration Detainee Pro 
Bono Opportunities Guide 1 (2004).
83 See 2003 Yearbook, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 56.
84 8 C.F.R. § 208.1(a) (2005).
85 Id. § 208.2(a).
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Both affirmative and defensive applicants must undergo identity 
verification and background checks before being eligible for asylum.87
The government issues each asylum applicant a file number, or “alien 
number,” which is entered into the Refugees, Asylum and Parole System 
(“RAPS”) database.88 RAPS interfaces with both the Computer Linked 
Applicant Information System (“CLAIMS”) to identify and update 
asylum applicants’ address changes, and with the Receipt and Alien File 
Accountability Control System (“RAFACS”) to keep track of asylum 
applicants’ files.89 The asylum office may not grant asylum without first 
checking the identity of the applicant against all appropriate government 
databases, including the State Department’s Consular Lookout and 
Support System (“CLASS”)90 and the Department of Homeland Security 
biometric identification system known as “IDENT.”91
All affirmative applicants and their dependents must attend a face-to-face 
interview with a CIS asylum officer,92 in order to “elicit all useful and 
relevant information bearing on the applicant’s eligibility for asylum.” 
During this “nonadversarial”93 interview, the applicant “may have 
counsel or a representative present, may present witnesses, and may 
submit affidavits of witnesses and other evidence.”94 If the asylum office 
approves the case, the applicant will be granted asylum upon completion 
of the security checks. If the asylum office denies the case, and the 
applicant is not in lawful status, he or she receives notice of removal 
proceedings and must appear before an immigration judge.95
An asylum applicant in removal proceedings is under the jurisdiction of 
the Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review 
(EOIR).96 Unlike the asylum interview, a removal hearing is an 
adversarial process. A trial attorney for ICE prosecutes the case.97
Immigration court respondents may be represented by counsel, but not at 
government expense.98 Each side may present documentary and 
testimonial evidence, conduct direct and cross examination, and object to 
the evidence and questions of the other side.99 If an immigration judge 
declines to grant asylum or other relief, that judge has the authority to 
issue an order of removal.100
86 Id. §§ 208.2(b), 208.4(b)(3).
87 Id. §§ 208.9(b), 208.10, 240.67, 1240.67.
88 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Immigration and 
Naturalization Service Refugees, Asylum and Parole System Audit Report (1998), available 
at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/reports/INS/a9811.htm.
89 Id.
90 Ira J. Kurzban, Immigration Law Sourcebook 383 (9th ed. 2004).
91 Id. at 100.
92 8 C.F.R. § 208.9(b) (2005). The interview is conducted at one of eight U.S. asylum 
offices. See U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Asylum Offices, at http://uscis. 
gov/graphics/fieldoffices/aboutus.htm#asylum (last visited Nov. 18, 2005).
93 8 C.F.R. § 208.9(b) (2005). In the experience of the author, the meaning of “non-
adversarial” varies among asylum officers. Some asylum officers conduct interviews in a 
pleasant, non-threatening manner, while others tend to be aggressive and confrontational.
94 Id.
95 Id. § 208.14(c)(1).
96 Id. § 1003.14(a).
97 Id. § 1003.16(a).
98 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A) (2000); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.16(b) (2005).
99 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(B) (2000).
100 Id. § 1229a(c)(1)(A), 8 C.F.R. § 208.14(a) (2005).
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Both ICE prosecutors and asylum applicants are entitled to appeal 
immigration judges’ decisions to the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(BIA).101 Regulations mandate that the BIA complete appeals within 180 
days.102 During that time, asylum applicants must continue to keep the 
government apprised of their whereabouts.103
C. The Real ID Act’s Passage
With the implementation of the laws and procedures discussed above, 
asylum—despite never having been a particularly popular avenue for 
terrorists to pursue—had become even more difficult to abuse. Filing 
deadlines, restrictions on employment authorization, face-to-face 
interviews with immigration officers, numerous background and identity 
checks, and mandatory detention combined to create a less-than-ideal 
environment for an individual seeking to abuse the asylum process.
The 1996 Act, and particularly its expedited removal process, has been 
praised as “a key tool in overall border and anti-fraud strategy.”104
Thus, despite no indication that the asylum system needed strengthening 
beyond the provisions of the 1996 Act, the Real ID Act, authored by 
House Judiciary Committee Chairman Sensenbrenner, was attached to an 
emergency Iraq appropriations bill105 and passed on May 11, 2005.106
Because legislators considered the appropriations bill to be “must-sign” 
legislation,107 the Real ID Act passed without floor debate.108 This stands 
101 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(b), 1003.38(a) (2005).
102 Id. § 1003.1(e)(8)(i). The 180-day rule applies to those appeals reviewed by a three-
member panel of BIA members. Most appeals are subject to single member review, 
however, and must be adjudicated within ninety days. Id.
103 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1)(F) (2000).
104 David A. Martin, Two Cheers for Expedited Removal in the New Immigration Laws, 
40 Va. J. Int’l L. 673, 675 (2000); see also Bo Cooper, Procedures for Expedited Removal 
and Asylum Screening Under the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act of 1996, 29 Conn. L. Rev. 1501, 1524 (1997) (stating that “Congress has 
created procedures that appear susceptible of fair application meeting the international 
standards, and the executive branch has taken a number of important steps that go far 
toward ensuring adequate protection of asylum seekers who fall within those procedures”). 
Both David A. Martin and Bo Cooper are former INS General Counsels.
105 See Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on 
Terror, and Tsunami Relief of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 (2005); Suzanne 
Gamboa, More Visas for Nurses, Seasonal Workers Added to Iraq Spending Bill, AP, May 
3, 2005 (“House and Senate negotiators reached agreement Tuesday in the final $82 billion 
bill devoted primarily to paying for military operations and reconstruction in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.”).
106 Real ID Act, Pub. L. No. 109-13, Div. B, 119 Stat. 231 (2005).
107 151 Cong. Rec. S4816, 4837 (daily ed. May 10, 2005) (statement of Sen. Chafee 
(R-R.I.)) (“By attaching REAL ID to a must pass spending measure, the critical process of 
vetting the bill in committee was circumvented and an opportunity for discussion and 
debate, which is essential for effective legislation, was denied.”); id. at 4831 (Statement of 
Sen. Obama (D-Ill.)) (stating that the immigration provisions of the Real ID Act will 
become law “not because it is the right thing to do but because the House majority has 
abused its privilege to attach this unexamined bill to must-pass legislation”).
108 See id. at 4820 (statement of Sen. Byrd (D-W. Va.)) (expressing disappointment that 
the Real ID Act “was simply grafted onto the emergency supplemental appropriations bill 
that provides funding for our military operations and our troops, without debate or 
participation by the conferees”); id. at 4826 (statement of Sen. Murray (D-Wash.)) 
(expressing concern that “far-reaching and unrelated immigration rules got attached to this 
bill without a vote and without an opportunity for debate”); id. at 4831 (statement of Sen. 
Obama) (expressing concern that, despite the controversial immigration provisions of the 
Real ID Act, “the Senate did not conduct a full hearing or debate on any one of them”).
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in stark contrast to the debate given to most other pre–September 11 
antiterrorism legislation, such as PATRIOT Act,109 even though both gave 
law enforcement and other government officials authority to detain and 
investigate noncitizens.
IV. Interpreting the Real ID Act
The Real ID Act addresses three main areas of asylum law. First, the Real 
ID Act attempts to codify case law on claims in which the persecutor 
may have been motivated by several factors, one or more of which may 
not conform to the definition of a refugee.110 These “mixed motive” cases 
have generated conflicting jurisprudence,111 but the Real ID Act’s attempt 
to codify the majority view creates more confusion than it alleviates.
Second, the Real ID Act addresses corroboration requirements. Again, its 
drafters attempted to codify long-established case law regarding when 
adjudicators may require additional evidence apart from the applicant’s 
testimony alone.112 Yet, in doing so, the drafters failed to explicitly 
include the “reasonableness” requirement found in leading case law.113
This careless drafting leaves room for adjudicators to abuse their 
discretion in deciding when to require corroboration by making patently 
unreasonable corroboration demands on asylum applicants.
Finally, the Real ID Act addresses credibility. In most respects, the 
credibility provision of the statute codifies case law.114 Yet, on the matter 
of immaterial inconsistencies, the Real ID Act’s provisions115 again make 
a significant departure from case law, United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees guidelines, and Immigration and 
Naturalization Service guidelines.116
The Sections that follow closely examine and analyze each of these 
provisions. The analysis shows that the law, though potentially 
109 See generally Akram & Karmely, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.
(examining the PATRIOT Act and other pre–September 11 policies and legislation 
targeting Arab and Muslim citizens and noncitizens).
110 Real ID Act, Pub. L. No. 109-13, Div. B, § 101(a)(3)(B)(i), 119 Stat. 231, 303 
(2005).
111 Compare, e.g., Singh v. Gonzalez, 406 F.3d 191, 197 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that 
“an applicant for asylum need not prove that the persecution he or she suffered (or fears 
suffering in the future) occurred solely on account of one of the five grounds enumerated 
in the INA. Rather, an applicant must show that the persecution was motivated, at least in 
part, by one of the protected characteristics.”) with Gebremichael v. INS, 10 F.3d 28, 35 
(1st Cir. 1993) (holding that the enumerated ground must be at the “root of persecution”). 
The first view is the one adopted by the majority of Courts of Appeals. See, e.g., Lopez-
Soto v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 228, 236 (4th Cir. 2004); Marku v. Ashcroft, 380 F.3d 982, 988 
n.10 (6th Cir. 2004); Girma v. INS, 283 F.3d 664, 667 (5th Cir. 2002); Singh v. Ilchert, 63 
F.3d 1501, 1509 (9th Cir. 1995); Osorio v. INS, 18 F.3d 1017, 1028 (2d Cir. 1994).
112 § 101(a)(3)(B)(ii), 119 Stat. at 303 (“Where the trier of fact determines that the 
applicant should provide evidence that corroborates otherwise credible testimony, such 
evidence must be provided unless the applicant does not have the evidence and cannot 
reasonably obtain the evidence.”).
113 Matter of S-M-J-, 21 I&N Dec. 722, 725 (B.I.A. 1997).
114 § 101(a)(3)(B)(iii), 119 Stat. at 303.
115 Id. (stating credibility determinations should be made “without regard to whether 
an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim . . . .”).
116 See, e.g., Singh v. INS, 365 F.3d 1164, 1171 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Minor inconsistencies 
in the record such as discrepancies in dates which reveal nothing about an asylum 
applicant’s fear for his safety are not an adequate basis for an adverse credibility finding.”) 
(quoting Vilorio-Lopez v. INS, 852 F.2d 1137, 1142 (9th Cir. 1988)).
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detrimental to legitimate asylum seekers, is not necessarily so. If 
interpreted as suggested below, the damage it may cause to asylum 
seekers can be minimized.
A. Was It Really Persecution? The Problem of “Mixed Motive” Cases
1. Current Law on Proving that the Harm Suffered Was “on 
Account of” One of the Five Grounds for Asylum
An applicant for asylum must prove that the harm he or she suffered 
amounted to persecution. The test for whether harm rises to the level of 
persecution is threefold. First, the applicant must have suffered harm 
severe enough to rise to the level of persecution.117 Second, the harm 
must have been committed by a government or an entity that the 
government is unable or unwilling to control.118 Third, the harm must 
have occurred on account of at least one of the five grounds of asylum: 
race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a 
particular social group.119 The Real ID Act addresses the third 
component, stating that asylum applicants must prove that one of the five 
grounds for asylum was or will be “at least one central reason” for the 
persecution they endured.120Many asylum cas s involve “mixed motives,” in which persecution may 
have occurred on account of one or more non-protected grounds, as well 
as one or more protected grounds. In 1992, the Supreme Court held in 
INS v. Elias-Zacarias, that an applicant must provide “some evidence . . . 
direct or circumstantial” of the persecutor’s motive.121 The Court further 
specified that establishing asylum eligibility does not require “direct 
proof of [the] persecutors’ motives.”122 Moreover, “an applicant does not 
bear the unreasonable burden of establishing the exact motivation of a 
‘persecutor’ where different reasons for actions are possible.”123
The importance of these holdings cannot be overstated, because, as 
discussed more fully in Part III.B, infra, persecutors generally do not 
provide their victims with evidence of, insights into, or discussion about 
the atrocities they commit. Requiring asylum applicants to prove the 
mental states of their persecutors to an adjudicator would be an almost 
impossible burden for applicants to meet.124 Moreover, according to the 
117 See Mihalev v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 722, 730 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that detention 
for ten days accompanied by daily beatings and hard labor constitutes persecution, even in 
the absence of serious physical injury); Ouda v. INS, 324 F.3d 445, 454 (6th Cir. 2003) 
(finding that threats and beatings combined with deprivation of livelihood and ability to leave 
home amount to persecution); Andriasian v. INS, 180 F.3d 1033, 1042 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(holding that persistent death threats and assaults on one’s family constitute persecution).
118 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2000). See also, e.g., Galicia v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 446, 
448 (1st Cir. 2005); Abdulrahman v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 587, 592 (3d Cir. 2003); Llana-
Castellon v. INS, 16 F.3d 1093, 1097–98 (10th Cir. 1994).
119 8 C.F.R. § 208.13 (b)(2)(A) (2005).
120 Real ID Act, Pub. L. No. 109-13, Div. B, § 101(a)(3)(B)(i), 119 Stat. 231, 303 
(2005).
121 502 U.S. 478, 483 (1992).
122 Id.
123 Shoafera v. INS, 228 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Matter of Fuentes, 
19 I&N Dec. 658, 662 (B.I.A. 1988)); see also Romilus v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 
2004) (“[N]or is [the asylum applicant] required to establish [the persecutors’] exact 
motivations.”).
124 See, e.g., Zubeda v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 463, 474 (3d Cir. 2003) (“[R]equiring an 
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Board of Immigration Appeals,125 “[s]uch a rigorous standard would 
largely render nugatory the Supreme Court’s decision in INS v. Cardoza-
Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987), and be inconsistent with the ‘well-
founded fear’ standard embodied in the ‘refugee’ definition.”126
2. The Real ID Act: “At Least One Central Reason”
The Real ID Act states that asylum applicants must prove that “race, 
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political 
opinion was or will be at least one central reason for persecuting the 
applicant.”127 Although, as discussed below, this language can and should 
be interpreted as a codification of Matter of S-P-, the use of the term 
“central” creates opportunity for adjudicators to require more proof of 
causation than Elias-Zacarias and Matter of S-P- permit.
The Real ID Act does not define “centrality,” but it appears to have 
adopted the term “central” from proposed INS regulations issued in 
December 2000128 in which centrality was a major theme. In those 
regulations, the INS proposed that “[i]n cases involving a persecutor with 
mixed motivations, the applicant must establish that the applicant’s 
protected characteristic is central to the persecutor’s motivation to act 
against the applicant.”129 In explaining the reasoning behind this 
proposed regulation, the INS cited two cases which purportedly 
represented “conflicting interpretations of the extent to which the 
persecutor’s motivation must relate to a protected characteristic”:130 the 
Ninth Circuit case Singh v. Ilchert131 and the First Circuit case 
Gebremichael v. INS.132 In Singh, the Ninth Circuit held that “persecutory 
conduct may have more than one motive, and so long as one motive is 
one of the statutorily enumerated grounds, the requirements have been 
satisfied.”133 In its decision in Gebremichael, the First Circuit stated that 
an asylum applicant must prove that one of the five statutory grounds is 
“at the root of persecution.”134
Despite the INS’s reasoning that these opinions were at odds with each 
other,135 a more careful reading of the cases shows that the INS misread 
the First Circuit case and that no split ever existed. In using the phrase 
“root of persecution,” the First Circuit simply borrowed language from 
its own prior decision in Ananeh-Firempong v. INS.136 In that case, the 
alien to establish the specific intent of his/her persecutors could impose insurmountable 
obstacles. . . .”).
125 Matter of S-P-, 21 I&N Dec. 486, 489–90 (B.I.A. 1996).
126 Id. See also INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (holding that asylum 
seekers must prove only a reasonable possibility of persecution in order to establish a well-
founded fear).
127 Real ID Act, Pub. L. No. 109-13, Div. B, § 101(a)(3)(B)(i), 119 Stat. 231, 303 (2005).
128 Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588, 76,598 (Dec. 7, 2000).
129 Id. at 76,598.
130 Id. at 76,592.
131 63 F.3d 1501 (9th Cir. 1995).
132 10 F.3d 28 (1st Cir. 1993).
133 Singh, 63 F.3d at 1509.
134 Gebremichael, 10 F.3d at 35.
135 See supra notes Error! Bookmark not defined.–Error! Bookmark not defined.
and accompanying text.
136 766 F.2d 621 (1st Cir. 1985).
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court quoted the following language from a United Nations Asylum 
Handbook:137
Membership [in] such a particular social group may be at the 
root of persecution because there is no confidence in the group’s 
loyalty to the Government or because the political outlook, 
antecedents or economic activity of its members or the very 
existence of the social group as such, is held to be an obstacle to 
the Government’s policies.138
The UNHCR Handbook was used merely to define the term “social group,” 
rather than to address “centrality” of motive. The First Circuit even noted 
as such in Ananeh-Firempong, stating that the UNHCR Handbook is a 
“‘useful tool’ for interpreting the phrase ‘social group’ as it appears in 
the U.N. Protocol . . . .”139 Thus, the court, in using the language “root of 
persecution,” did not intend to propound a bright-line rule for 
determining the motivation of a persecutor.140
INS’s reliance on the Gebremichael “root of persecution” formula is even 
more problematic when one considers that the First Circuit was the only
circuit even arguably to use such an analysis when determining the 
persecutor’s motive. The Second, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits were united 
in the prevailing view that persecution on account of a protected ground 
is established when the applicant proves that the persecutor’s motives 
were based in part on a protected ground.141
Moreover, the legislative history of the Real ID Act clearly indicates the 
legislature’s support for the prevailing view among the Courts of Appeals 
regarding motive. First, the conference committee replaced the phrase “a 
central reason” in the House of Representatives version of the bill142 with 
the phrase “at least one central reason.”143 This substitution emphasizes 
that more than one motive may prompt a persecutor to cause harm and 
that the asylum seeker need not prove that the protected ground was 
foremost in the persecutor’s mind.
137 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Handbook on 
Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status, U.N. Doc. HCR/IP/4/ Eng/Rev.1 
(1992) [hereinafter UNHCR Handbook].
138 766 F.2d at 626 (quoting UNHCR Handbook at ¶ 78).
139 Id.
140 Even if the First Circuit’s use of the term “root of persecution” were to be 
construed as a means of analyzing the motivation of a persecutor, it properly applies only 
in the context of withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (2000), which carries a 
substantially higher burden of proof than asylum. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 
421, 430–33 (1987).
141 See, e.g., Chang v. INS, 119 F.3d 1055, 1065 (3d Cir. 1997) (granting petition for 
review where persecutor’s motivation was based in part on a protected ground); Singh v. 
Ilchert, 63 F.3d 1501, 1509 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that “an applicant is not required to 
provide direct proof of her persecutor’s motives but rather some evidence of it, direct or 
circumstantial”); Osorio v. INS, 18 F.3d 1017, 1028 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that 
persecution on account of a protected ground “does not mean persecution solely on 
account of the victim’s political opinion. That is, the conclusion that a cause of persecution 
is economic does not necessarily imply that there cannot exist other causes of the 
persecution.”). This view was later adopted by most other circuits. See Lopez-Soto v. 
Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 228, 236 (4th Cir. 2004); Marku v. Ashcroft, 380 F.3d 982, 988 n.10 
(6th Cir. 2004); Girma v. INS, 283 F.3d 664, 667 (5th Cir. 2002).
142 H.R. 418, 109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005).
143 H.R. Rep. No. 109-72 (2005) (Conf. Rep.).
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Second, the Act’s drafters intended that “[t]he central reason standard 
will . . . require aliens who allege persecution because they have been 
erroneously identified as terrorists to bear the same burden as all other 
asylum applicants . . . in accordance with Supreme Court precedent.”144
While this distinction did not appear in the legislation itself, it indicates 
that the rephrased centrality requirement was not intended to impose a 
higher bar for all asylum applicants beyond what the Supreme Court had 
already enunciated; rather, it was simply imposed to prevent applicants 
accused of being terrorists from getting a lower bar.
The only sensible interpretation of the centrality provision of the Real ID 
Act, therefore, is that adjudicators should continue to rely on the standard 
set forth in the Supreme Court’s Elias-Zacarias decision and the BIA 
case Matter of S-P- for the “nexus” determination. That is, an adjudicator 
must conclude whether, based on a reasonable interpretation of the facts 
and the evidence, the persecution occurred at least in part because of one 
of the five grounds.145 This analysis also comports with what the INS 
suggested in the preamble to the 2000 proposed regulations: that nexus is 
not established “if the protected characteristic was incidental or 
tangential to the persecutor’s motivation.”146 There is no evidence, then, 
suggesting that drafters intended a heightened nexus requirement for 
asylum applicants.
3. Analyzing Nexus Under the Real ID Act: “Miguel’s Case”
The case of Miguel,147 an asylum seeker from Colombia, illustrates the 
analysis set forth above. Miguel owned a small factory in Bogotá, 
Colombia. He belonged to a small local branch of the national 
conservative party called the National Salvation Movement (Movimiento 
de Salvación Nacional, “MSN”). As a factory owner, Miguel sought to 
employ poor rural youth who, because of their socioeconomic status, are 
at high risk for recruitment by a guerrilla group called the Armed 
Revolutionary Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de 
Colombia, “FARC”). As a member of the MSN, Miguel donated building 
materials for civic projects in the poverty-stricken rural areas 
surrounding Bogotá. He also supported political candidates who reflected 
his conservative, anti-guerrilla values and political viewpoint.
In May 1999, a group of armed men robbed Miguel’s factory at gunpoint. 
Miguel was not present, but his wife, sister-in-law, and several 
employees were. The armed men identified themselves as guerrillas and 
demanded that the captives turn over their jewelry and cash. They also 
forced Miguel’s wife to turn over the keys to one of the company SUVs. 
Before leaving, they locked everyone in a room and warned them not to 
report the incident to the police. After escaping, Miguel’s wife promptly 
144 H.R. Rep. No. 109-72, at 165 (emphasis added).
145 See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483 (1992); Matter of S-P-, 21 I&N Dec. 
486, 494 (B.I.A. 1996).
146 Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588, 76,592 (Dec. 7, 2000).
147
“Miguel” is the pseudonym of an actual client of the Villanova Clinic for Asylum, 
Refugees, and Emigrant Services (CARES) who, along with his family, was granted 
asylum. The names of CARES’s clients are kept anonymous due to the highly personal 
nature of asylum claims. Documentation is on file with the author.
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filed a police report. Shortly thereafter, Miguel received a menacing 
letter from a person claiming to be a FARC commander and threatening 
harm against the family in retaliation for Miguel’s wife’s reporting the 
robbery to the police.
From those facts alone, the only indication that the robbery and the threat 
were politically motivated is that the robbers and letter writer identified 
themselves as guerrillas. The main purpose for their attack on Miguel’s 
factory seems to have been to obtain cash and a vehicle; the main 
purpose of the letter seems to have been to retaliate against or intimidate 
the family for reporting the robbery to the police. Thus, on these facts 
alone, it would be difficult for Miguel to prove that his membership in an 
anti-guerrilla political party had much, if anything, to do with the 
robbery and threatening letter. His political opinion may have in part 
motivated the guerrillas to steal from him rather than from someone who 
supports their cause, but there is no evidence of that in this account. 
These facts would indicate that the motivation on account of a protected 
ground was tangential or incidental at best, but would not necessarily 
satisfy the centrality requirement.
Miguel’s case, however, contains additional facts that would demonstrate 
a sufficient nexus between the persecution suffered and one of the five 
grounds for asylum. Shortly following the robbery, the family began 
receiving threatening phone calls from a person claiming to be a FARC 
commander, demanding that Miguel discontinue his “activities.” In 
addition, two men who identified themselves as guerrillas briefly 
abducted Miguel’s eldest daughter at gunpoint and ordered her to tell her 
father to stop his activities. The robbery, when viewed in conjunction 
with these additional incidents, takes on new meaning: this family was a 
specific target of a guerrilla group attempting to curtail Miguel’s political 
activities.
Moreover, Miguel’s student representatives provided a number of 
supporting documents demonstrating that political opinion and 
membership in a particular social group, rather than financial gain or 
general violence, motivated the guerrillas. An expert in Miguel’s case 
testified that the guerrillas, who purport to follow strict Marxist tenets, 
target small business owners because they represent the capitalism and 
free market economy that Marxists oppose. A State Department Report 
on Human Rights in Colombia, as well as reports from several respected 
human rights groups, indicated that FARC guerrillas were responsible for 
numerous attacks against individuals whom they perceived as 
ideologically and politically opposed to FARC’s goals.
This evidence, together with the family’s testimony, was sufficient to 
prove centrality under the Real ID Act and allow Miguel to be granted 
asylum. Although no direct evidence of the persecutor’s exact motivation 
exists, it is clear that the protected grounds—political opinion and 
membership in a particular social group—were not merely incidental or 
tangential motivations for the persecution. FARC may have targeted 
Miguel and his family in part for pecuniary gain, but Miguel’s opposition 
to FARC, manifested in his business and political activities, formed at 
least part of the motivation for the attacks on Miguel’s family.
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B. Corroborating Evidence: How Much Is Enough?
1. Corroboration of Persecution Generally
Corroborating asylum claims presents significant challenges, especially 
in terms of logistics and authentication. Obviously, most asylum seekers 
will not come to court equipped with notarized affidavits from their 
persecutors stating, “I, Joe Persecutor, beat and tortured your client on 
three occasions between December 1999 and August 2003 on account of 
her political opinion against our oppressive but beloved dictator. Her 
political opinion was foremost in my mind when this occurred.”148
Moreover, many asylum seekers arrive from countries that lack 
infrastructure, adequate communication systems, and sometimes even a 
functioning government.149 Obtaining documents, even ones as relatively 
common as a birth certificate or medical report, can therefore involve 
logistical impediments that often prove insurmountable.
Additionally, persons escaping persecution may leave behind important 
documents (such as identity cards, birth certificates, medical records, 
etc.) when fleeing their countries, either in haste or in an attempt to 
conceal their identities from persecutors.150 By attempting to obtain the 
documents later, an asylum seeker risks interception of his or her mail, 
potentially exposing family and friends to harassment by the persecuting 
entity.151 Even documentation of physical trauma itself can be difficult to 
obtain, such as in rape cases, with often little if any physical evidence.152
In many cases, therefore, the more legitimate the persecution, the less 
likely it is that the asylum seeker will have the required proof. As such, 
establishment of an accurate but not unduly burdensome corroboration 
148 See Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277, 1285 (9th Cir. 1984) (“Persecutors 
are hardly likely to provide their victims with affidavits attesting to their acts of 
persecution.”); see also generally Virgil Wiebe et al., Asking for a Note from Your Torturer:
Corrobo-ration and Authentication Requirements in Asylum, Withholding and Torture
Convention Cases, 01-10 Immigr. Briefings 1 (Oct. 2001) (discussing in detail the 
corroboration require-ments for asylum seekers).
149 See United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Refugees: 2004 Year in 
Review, Refugees Mag., Jan. 1, 2005, at 8–12 (describing conditions in refugee-producing 
countries around the world), available at http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/publ/opendoc. 
pdf?tbl=PUBL&id=41e3a9fc4.
150 See Michele R. Pistone, The New Asylum Rule: Improved but Still Unfair, 16 Geo. 
Immigr. L.J. 1, 8 (2001) (explaining that “records may take months or years to compile 
because refugees usually leave them behind, and the documents may be available only in 
the country from which the refugee has ºed.”).
151 See id. (stating that “[e]ven if friends or family members can obtain copies of the 
documents, hostile governments may intercept international mail. Therefore, asylum 
applicants may hesitate for a long time before asking others to put themselves at risk by 
requesting corroborating records.”).
152 See Physicians for Human Rights, Examining Asylum Seekers: A Health 
Professional’s Guide to Medical and Psychological Evaluations of Torture 54–61 (2001). 
The Guide states:
In the majority of political asylum applicants who allege sexual assault during 
torture, the traumatic event(s) will have occurred months or years before the 
medical examination. Therefore, most individuals will not have physical signs at 
the time of the examination. . . . Even on examination of the female genitalia 
immediately after rape there is identifiable damage in less than 50% of cases. 
Anal examination of males and females after anal rape shows lesions in less than
30% of cases.
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process can be very difficult.
2. The Courts on Corroboration
Courts have recognized the unique challenges discussed above. In 1987, 
the Board of Immigration Appeals decided in Matter of Mogharrabi that, 
due to the difficulty asylum seekers often face in obtaining corroborating 
evidence, “the applicant’s testimony [alone] will suffice if it is credible, 
detailed and specific.”153 Several Courts of Appeals adopted this 
reasoning,154 and it eventually made its way into the Code of Federal 
Regulations.155
Two years later, in Matter of Dass, the Board clarified its holding in 
Matter of Mogharrabi and articulated a general rule for corroboration: 
where corroborating evidence is available, the applicant should present 
it; when unavailable, the applicant should explain why.156 The Board also 
distinguished between a claim “focused on specific events involving the 
[applicant] personally” and a “sweeping and general” claim involving an 
elaborate background context.157 The Board noted that in order to better 
establish the credibility of the applicant’s story, more corroborating 
background evidence would be necessary in the latter.158
The Board further refined this holding in Matter of S-M-J-,159 clarifying 
that in cases where corroborating evidence is reasonably expected, it 
should be provided.160 The Board went on to say that if the applicant fails 
to present such evidence, it “can lead to a finding that [the] applicant has 
failed to meet her burden of proof.”161 However, the Board noted that 
specific “documentary corroboration of an applicant’s particular 
experiences is not required unless the supporting documentation is of the 
type that would normally be created or available in the particular country 
and is accessible to the alien, such as through friends, relatives, or co-
workers.”162
153 19 I&N Dec. 439, 444 (B.I.A. 1987) (relying on Cardoza-Fonseca v. INS, 767 F.2d 
1448, 1458 (9th Cir. 1985)).
154 See Cordon Garcia v. INS, 204 F.3d 985, 992–93 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that due 
to “the serious difficulty with which asylum applicants are faced in their attempts to prove 
persecution . . . this court does not require corroborative evidence” from asylum applicants 
who have testified credibly); Gumbol v. INS, 815 F.2d 406, 412 (6th Cir. 1987) (citing 
Youkhanna v. INS, 749 F.2d 360, 362 (6th Cir. 1984)) (holding that an asylum seeker must 
present some specific facts, either through objective evidence or through persuasive 
credible testimony, to show that his fear of persecution is well-founded); Ganjour v. INS, 
796 F.2d 832, 837 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that an asylum applicant “must present specific
facts, through objective evidence if possible, or through his or her own persuasive, 
credible testimony, showing actual persecution or detailing some other good reason to fear 
persecution . . . .” (quoting Carvajal-Munoz v. INS, 743 F.2d 562, 576 (7th Cir. 1984)).
155 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.13(a), 208.16(b), 1208.13(a), 1208.16(b) (1990).
156 20 I&N Dec. 120, 124–25 (B.I.A. 1989).
157 Id. at 125.
158 Id.
159 21 I&N Dec. 722 (B.I.A. 1997).
160 See id. at 725 (holding that “[u]nreasonable demands are not placed on an asylum 
applicant to present evidence to corroborate particular experiences (e.g., corroboration 
from the persecutor). However, where it is reasonable to expect corroborating evidence for 
certain alleged facts pertaining to the specifics of an applicant’s claim, such evidence should 
be provided.”).
161 Id. at 726 (emphasis added).
162 Id. See also Matter of M-D-, 21 I&N Dec. 1180 (B.I.A. 1998), rev’d sub nom. 
Diallo v. INS, 232 F.3d 279 (2d. Cir. 2000) (upholding the BIA’s determination that asylum 
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Matter of S-M-J- also provides examples of the types of facts “easily 
subject to verification”163 for which adjudicators may reasonably expect 
corroborating evidence. Those examples include “evidence of [the 
applicant’s] place of birth, media accounts of large demonstrations, 
evidence of a publicly held office, or documentation of medical 
treatment.”164Importantly, the BIA placed the burden of providing evidence of general 
country conditions on the adjudicator165 and the government attorneys,166
as well as on the asylum applicant. Thus, most asylum cases presumably 
have at least a State Department Report in the record, often supplied by 
the government. This aspect of Matter of S-M-J- is especially relevant in 
cases involving unrepresented, detained clients with limited or no access 
to resources or legal aid.167
The opinion’s admonitions to adjudicators and government attorneys 
aside, Matter of S-M-J- is not particularly sympathetic to the plight of 
asylum seekers. A document that is easily subject to verification may still 
not be easily obtainable by an individual fleeing persecution. A refugee 
from war-torn Somalia who lived for years in a Kenyan refugee camp, 
for example, is unlikely to have or be able to obtain a document as 
common and presumably simple as a birth certificate. Moreover, what an 
adjudicator considers reasonable to provide may differ from a 
persecution victim’s perception of what is reasonable to provide, due to 
the fears discussed above: interception by government officials, danger 
to family members, and repercussions for colleagues.
In Ladha v. INS,168 the Ninth Circuit explicitly rejected the corroboration 
rule of Matter of S-M-J-, basing its holding on three lines of Ninth 
Circuit cases. The first line of cases “emphasizes the difficulty of proving 
applicants should provide corroborating evidence when it is available).
163 21 I&N Dec. at 725.
164 Id.
165 See Matter of S-M-J-, 21 I&N Dec. at 727 (stating that: 
Although the burden of proof is not on the Immigration Judge, if background 
information is central to an alien’s claim, and the Immigration Judge relies on the 
country conditions in adjudicating the alien’s case, the source of the Immigration 
Judge’s knowledge of the particular country must be made part of the record . . . . 
Thus, the statute specifically recognizes that the presentation of evidence is a 
proper function of an Immigration Judge.).
166 See id. (holding that “[a]s a general matter, therefore, we expect the Service to 
introduce into evidence current country reports, advisory opinions, or other information 
readily available from the Resource Information Center”).
167 See Michele R. Pistone, Justice Delayed Is Justice Denied: A Proposal for Ending 
the Unnecessary Detention of Asylum Seekers, 12 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 197, 219–20 (1999) 
[hereinafter Justice Delayed is Justice Denied]. The author noted:
Detained asylum seekers usually do not have access to relevant legal or 
background resource materials. Indeed, until recently, the INS did not have any 
standards concerning the content of legal libraries at detention facilities. Even 
though these standards are in place, they do not apply to non-INS facilities such 
as local, county, and city jails where many asylum seekers are detained; therefore, 
the contents fall far short of alleviating concerns about the availability of 
sufficient corroborative materials. The standards do not require libraries to 
maintain up-to-date information about country conditions . . . . Even with all the 
relevant legal and country condition resource materials necessary to present a 
claim for asylum, only the minority of asylum seekers fluent in English are able 
to use them.
168 215 F.3d 889, 899 (9th Cir. 2000).
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specific threats by persecutors, and emphasizes that credible testimony as 
to a threat is sufficient to prove that the threat was made.”169 The second 
line of cases “emphasizes that not only specific threats but also other 
facts that serve as the basis for an asylum or withholding claim can be 
shown by credible testimony alone if corroborative evidence is 
‘unavailable.’”170 Finally, the third line of cases “make[s] clear that when 
an alien credibly testifies to certain facts, those facts are deemed true and 
the question remaining to be answered becomes whether these facts, and 
their reasonable inferences, satisfy the elements of the claim for 
relief.”171 Based on the reasoning in these three lines of cases, in which 
the court recognized the difficulties that asylum seekers face in 
attempting to corroborate their claims, the Ladha court held that “[t]o the 
extent that decisions such as Matter of S-M-J- . . . establish a 
corroboration requirement for credible testimony, they are 
disapproved.”172
Ladha’s reasoning, though arguably most in line with the spirit of 
refugee protection, was not favored among other Courts of Appeals.173 As 
such, there remains a split between the Circuit Courts of Appeals as to 
whether Matter of S-M-J- is good law.
3. Corroboration Under the Real ID Act
The Real ID Act permits an asylum seeker to corroborate his or her claim 
solely with his or her own testimony, but stipulates that such testimony 
must be “credible, . . . persuasive, and refer[ ] to specific facts sufficient 
to demonstrate that the applicant is a refugee.”174 However, even if that 
testimony is sufficient to establish asylum eligibility, the Real ID Act 
169 Id. (citing Lopez-Reyes v. INS, 79 F.3d 908, 912 (9th Cir. 1996); Artiga Turcios v. 
INS, 829 F.2d 729, 723 (9th Cir. 1987); and Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277, 
1285, 1288 (9th Cir. 1984)).
170 Ladha, 215 F.3d at 900 (citing Castillo v. INS, 951 F.2d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 1991); 
Limsico v. INS, 951 F.2d 210, 212 (9th Cir. 1991); Estrada-Posadas v. INS, 924 F.2d 916, 
918–19 (9th Cir. 1991); Aguilera-Cota v. INS, 914 F.3d 1375, 1378 (9th Cir. 1990); 
Blanco-Comarribas v. INS, 830 F.2d 1039, 1042–43 (9th Cir. 1987); Del Valle v. INS, 776 
F.2d 1407, 1411 (9th Cir. 1985); Cardoza-Fonseca v. INS, 767 F.2d 1448, 1453 (9th Cir. 
1985)).
171 Ladha, 215 F.3d at 900–01 (citing Khourassany v. INS, 208 F.3d 1096, 1100 (9th 
Cir. 2000); Yazitchian v. INS, 207 F.3d 1164, 1168 (9th Cir. 2000); Duarte de Guinac v. 
INS, 179 F.3d 1156, 1159 (9th Cir. 1999); Del Carmen Molina v. INS, 170 F.3d 1247, 1249 
& n.2 (9th Cir. 1999); Campos-Sanchez v. INS, 164 F.3d 448, 451 n.1 (9th Cir. 1999)).
172 Ladha, 215 F.3d at 901.
173 See Gontcharova v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 873, 877 (7th Cir. 2004) (declining to follow 
the Ninth Circuit’s rejection of Matter of S-M-J- but requiring that immigration judges 
explain their application of Matter of S-M-J-); El-Sheikh v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 643, 647 
(8th Cir. 2004) (quoting Diallo v. INS, 232 F.3d 279, 287 (2d Cir. 2000) and Abdulai v. 
Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 554 (3d Cir. 2001)) (declining to adopt the Ninth Circuit’s 
rejection of Matter of S-M-J- but adopting the Second and Third Circuits’ requirement that 
immigration judges and the BIA “(1) rule explicitly on the credibility of an applicant’s
testimony; (2) explain why it was reasonable to expect additional corroboration; and 
(3) assess the sufficiency of the applicant’s explanations for the absence of corroborating 
evidence”); Dorosh v. Ashcroft, 398 F.3d 379, 382 (6th Cir. 2004) (expressly rejecting the 
Ninth Circuit’s reasoning and adopting that of the Second and Third Circuits with regard to 
Matter of S-M-J-)). See generally Brian P. Downey & Angelo A. Stio, III, Of Course We 
Believe You, But . . . : The Third Circuit’s Position on Corroboration of Credible 
Testimony, 48 Vill. L. Rev. 1281 (2003).
174 Real ID Act, Pub. L. No. 109-13, Div. B, § 101(a)(3)(B)(ii), 119 Stat. 231, 303 
(2005).
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permits adjudicators to require corroborating evidence: “Where the trier 
of fact determines that the applicant should provide evidence that 
corroborates otherwise credible testimony, such evidence must be 
provided unless the applicant does not have the evidence and cannot 
reasonably obtain the evidence.”175 Therefore, that clause directly refutes 
Ladha’s ruling that no corroboration should be required for credible 
testimony, and for the most part, codifies Matter of S-M-J-.176
That the drafters of the Real ID Act chose to eviscerate Ladha was 
unfortunate, but not completely unexpected, particularly when most other
Circuit Courts of Appeals backed the Matter of S-M-J- ruling. Yet, the 
Real ID Act’s corroboration provisions are particularly troubling in that 
they differ from even the less desirable approach sanctioned by Matter of 
S-M-J- and the Courts of Appeals that approved of it. Those decisions 
required that adjudicators act reasonably in requesting additional 
corroboration and explain their rationale for the request.177 The Real ID 
Act’s provision, on the other hand, does not hold specifically 
adjudicators to a standard of reasonableness when determining whether 
corroboration is necessary or whether the corroboration provided is 
sufficient.The only sensible conclusion to draw from the Real ID Act’s drafters’ 
failure to include a reasonableness provision is that Congress intended 
adjudicators to rely on the guidance found in Matter of Mogharrabi,
Matter of Dass, and Matter of S-M-J- to determine when and what kind 
of corroboration should be expected. This is supported by the fact that 
the Act’s sponsors stated in the Conference Report that credibility 
determinations “must be reasonable and take into consideration the 
individual circumstances of the specific witness and/or applicant.”178 That 
language evinces a Congressional intent for the statute to be read in light 
of the Board’s “reasonableness” standard. Moreover, as a practical 
matter, failure on the part of appellate courts and immigration judges to 
read a reasonableness requirement into the Act could lead to abuse of 
discretion, inconsistent application of the law, and the denial of valid 
asylum claims.179
4. Analyzing the Real ID Act’s Corroboration Requirement:
The Case of Marie and Paul
The case of Marie and Paul,180 a married couple from Haiti, illustrates 
175 Id.
176 See H.R. Rep. No. 109-72, at H2870 (2005) (Conf. Rep.).
177 See Secaida-Rosales v. INS, 331 F.3d 297, 311 (2d Cir. 2003) (vacating a denial of 
asylum where, inter alia, the judge’s demands for corroboration of testimony were 
unreasonable); Georgis v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 962, 969 (7th Cir. 2003) (same); Senathirajah 
v. INS, 157 F.3d 210, 216 (3d Cir. 1998) (vacating a denial of withholding where the judge’s 
demands for corroboration were unreasonable in light of the validity of applicant’s testimony). 
178 H.R. Rep. No. 109-72, at H2870 (2005) (Conf. Rep.).
179 See Qiu v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 140, 153–54 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that “[u]nless the 
BIA anchors its demands for corroboration to evidence which indicates what the petitioner 
can reasonably be expected to provide, there is a serious risk that unreasonable demands 
will inadvertently be made. . . . What is (subjectively) natural to demand may not . . . be 
(objectively) reasonable.”).
180
“Marie” and “Paul” are pseudonyms of actual clients of the Villanova Clinic for 
Asylum, Refugee and Emigrant Services (CARES) who were granted asylum. The names of 
CARES’s clients are kept anonymous due to the highly personal nature of asylum claims. 
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how adjudicators should apply the Real ID Act’s corroboration 
requirement. Marie and Paul ºed Haiti with their two young daughters in 
the summer of 2003, during the rule of Jean-Bertand Aristide and his 
political party, the Fanmi Lavalas (“Lavalas”). Paul’s family opposed the 
Lavalas and he, as well as his brother, uncle, father, and the rest of the 
family, refused to take part in what they considered a corrupt political 
process. An armed, pro-Lavalas gang called the Chimeres attacked the 
family several times for their refusal to support the Lavalas. Still, the 
family refused to submit. One day, Paul’s uncle and brother went 
missing. Their house had been vandalized and they were never found. 
Paul’s father, fearing for his family members’ lives, raised money for 
Paul to flee Haiti with Marie and the children.
Upon arriving in the United States, Marie, Paul, and the children were 
placed in a family detention center. They applied for asylum but were 
detained for the duration of their proceedings. Fortunately, they secured 
representation through the Villanova Clinic for Asylum, Refugee and 
Emigrant Services.
Paul’s representatives submitted several pieces of evidence in support of 
his claim. First was Paul’s own affidavit. They also submitted a number 
of newspaper articles, the 2003 State Department Country Report on 
Human Rights for Haiti, several reports from reputable non-
governmental organizations, and the affidavit of an expert on Haiti. All 
of these materials corroborated Paul’s written and oral testimony and 
supported his claim that he would suffer beatings, torture, or even death 
if he were to return to Haiti.
Yet other materials that an adjudicator could reasonably expect were 
noticeably absent, such as affidavits from Paul’s family members, 
including his father, who had arranged for the trip. This is where the 
case-by-case analysis prescribed in Matter of S-M-J- becomes crucial. 
Marie and Paul were detained and destitute. They came from a poor 
village, and they, as well as their family members, had limited education. 
There were no telephones in their village. Paul and his representatives 
could have tried to send a letter, but even if the mail service had been 
adequate, the family members were not literate. Yet the general reports of 
Haitian country conditions—together with Paul’s consistent, detailed, 
and persuasive testimony—provided sufficient corroboration to establish 
a claim, and the immigration judge granted the family asylum.
Authorizing adjudicators to require corroboration in any form, for any 
fact, in any case, would serve only to imperil bona fide asylum seekers 
like Marie and Paul. It is therefore improper under the humanitarian 
spirit of the 1967 Protocol181 to impose such a severe and unrealistic 
burden of corroboration on asylum seekers. Rather, adjudicators should 
continue to follow the Matter of S-M-J- reasonableness test182 in 
determining when it is appropriate to require corroboration and what 
kind of corroboration it is appropriate to require.
Documentation is on file with the author.
181 See 1967 Protocol, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at pmbl.
182 21 I&N Dec. 722, 725 (B.I.A. 1997).
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C. Credibility: Is the Devil Now in the Details?
Credibility is arguably the most crucial aspect of any asylum case. As 
discussed above, specific corroboration is difficult, if not impossible, in many 
cases. An asylum applicant’s testimony is often the most probative 
evidence available. The credibility of that testimony therefore becomes 
critical.
Courts have endeavored to strike a balance between protecting the 
asylum system from fraud and accepting that certain minor factors may 
adversely impact credibility. Current case law stipulates that asylum 
adjudicators take into account the totality of the circumstances when 
making a credibility determination, including such factors as 
demeanor,183 plausibility,184 and factual inconsistencies and omissions.185
In addition, current regulations direct the BIA to apply a “clearly 
erroneous” standard of review with regard to credibility, thus affording 
great deference to immigration judges’ credibility determinations.186
Thus, because of the discretion involved in the adjudicator’s role and the 
deference accorded to it, incorrect interpretations of the Real ID Act’s 
credibility provisions may harm legitimate victims of persecution. It is 
therefore crucial to examine the particular factors that influence 
credibility determinations so as to assist judges in acting justly within 
their broad discretion.
1. Factors Impacting Credibility
a. Psychological Effects of Trauma
An asylum applicant may have one or more psychological disorders that 
affect credibility. Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) affects 
183 See Cordero-Trejo v. INS, 40 F.3d 482, 487 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding that credibility 
findings based on demeanor deserve more deference that those based on testimonial 
analysis); Sarvia-Quintanilla v. INS, 767 F.2d 1387, 1395 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that an 
immigration judge is in the unique position to observe the alien’s tone and demeanor, to 
explore inconsistencies in the testimony, and to determine whether the testimony has “the 
ring of truth”); Kokkinis v. Dist. Dir., 429 F.2d 938, 941–42 (2d Cir. 1970) (holding that 
“great weight” should be afforded to the findings of the special inquiry officer who 
conducted the deportation hearing, because, inter alia, he had the opportunity to observe 
the respondent’s demeanor); Matter of V-T-S-, 21 I&N Dec. 792, 796 (B.I.A. 1997) 
(recognizing the immigration judge’s “advantage of observing the alien as he testifies”).
184 See Salaam v. INS, 229 F.3d 1234 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that findings of 
implausibility cannot be based upon unsupported assumptions); Matter of B-, 21 I&N Dec. 
66, 71 (B.I.A. 1995) (holding that consistent, sufficiently detailed, and unembellished 
testimony may provide a plausible and coherent account of the basis for the fear of 
persecution, without corroborating evidence); Matter of Dass, 20 I&N Dec. 120, 124 (B.I.A. 
1989) (holding that the court is to determine whether the alien’s testimony is believable, 
consistent, and sufficiently detailed to provide a plausible and coherent account of the 
basis for his alleged fear); see also UNHCR Handbook, supra note Error! Bookmark not 
defined., at ¶ 204 (stating that “[t]he applicant’s statements must be coherent and plausible, 
and must not run counter to generally known facts”).
185 See In re A-S-, 21 I&N Dec. 1106, 1109 (B.I.A. 1998) (refusing to overturn an 
immigration judge’s adverse credibility determination based on inconsistencies and 
omissions, because the record revealed that “(1) the discrepancies and omissions described 
by the Immigration Judge are actually present; (2) these discrepancies and omissions 
provide specific and cogent reasons to conclude that the alien provided incredible 
testimony; and (3) a convincing explanation for the discrepancies and omissions had not 
been supplied by the alien”).
186 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i) (2005).
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survivors of or witnesses to severely traumatic events, such as rape, 
murder of loved ones, and physical or psychological torture.187 Sufferers 
of PTSD and other trauma-related disorders may have one or more of the 
following symptoms: ºat affect when relaying traumatic events, inability 
to remember dates or sequences of events correctly, dissociation, and 
avoidance.188 All of these symptoms affect the way an adjudicator 
perceives the veracity of an applicant’s statements. An applicant with a 
ºat affect rather than an emotional display while recounting her rape may 
appear incredible. An applicant who cannot recall the precise date on 
which he witnessed the massacre of his family may cause an adjudicator 
to doubt his credibility. Similarly, applicants who respond vaguely to 
direct questions about crucial elements of their claims may be 
dissociating or avoiding, but may appear to an adjudicator to be lying.189
Therefore, those individuals appearing most incredible will, in fact, often 
have suffered the most serious trauma.
b. Cultural Differences
Cultural differences may also have a strong impact on an adjudicator’s 
perception of an applicant’s credibility.190 Meeting the eyes of an 
authority figure and addressing him or her in a confident tone of voice 
may be an inconceivable notion to an applicant from a culture in which 
downcast eyes and soft speech are required to show respect.191 In the 
United States and other Western cultures, however, failing to meet an 
adjudicator’s eyes and speak firmly may to some observers indicate 
187 American Psychiatric Ass’n, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
424–25 (4th ed. 1994).
188 Id.; see also Memorandum from Jeff Weiss, Acting Dir., Office of Int’l Affairs, to 
Asylum Officers, Immigration Officers, and Headquarters Coordinators (Dec. 10, 1998), at 
14, available at http://uscis.gov/graphics/lawsregs/handbook/10a_ChldrnGdlns.pdf (stating 
that “[q]uestionable demeanor can be the product of culture or trauma rather than a lack of 
credibility. . . . Symptoms of trauma can include depression, indecisiveness, indifference, 
poor concentration, long pauses before answering, as well as avoidance or disassociation”) 
[hereinafter Children’s Guidelines].
189 See James C. Hathaway & William S. Hicks, Is There a Subjective Element in the 
Refugee Convention’s Requirement of “Well-Founded Fear?,” 26 Mich. J. Int’l L. 505, 
519–20 (2005) (“Individuals suffering from PTSD may be among the most fearful asylum 
applicants, yet they are acutely disadvantaged in their ability to communicate that 
trepidation to decisionmakers.”); Michael Kagan, Is Truth in the Eye of the Beholder? 
Objective Credibility Assessment in Refugee Status Determination, 17 Geo. Immigr. L.J.
367, 396 (2003) (“The psychological effects of traumatic events can hamper a refugee’s 
ability to communicate why he or she is afraid to return home, and make it difficult for 
some of the most vulnerable refugees to establish claims that would give them legal 
protection.”); Justice Delayed Is Justice Denied, supra note Error! Bookmark not 
defined., at 221 (explaining that the effects of PTSD “can lead to an adverse assessment of 
the asylum seeker’s credibility on the witness stand”).
190 See Beate Anna Ort, International and U.S. Obligations Toward Stowaway Asylum 
Seekers, 140 U. Pa. L. Rev. 285, 309–10 (1991) (explaining how cultural differences with 
regard to conceptions of family, geography, time, country, common sense, and “verbal
behavioral cues” affect credibility determinations in asylum cases); see also Kagan, supra 
note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 379 (“The nonverbal cues that people tend to rely 
on to decide if another person is telling the truth vary widely from culture to culture.”); 
Children’s Guidelines, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 14 (providing 
various examples of cultural differences that asylum officers will likely encounter).
191 Children’s Guidelines, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 14 (noting 
that downcast eyes are a signal of respect to authority in certain Asian cultures).
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evasiveness and deceit.192 Similarly, a rape victim from a culture in which 
the victim is often blamed, ostracized or even severely punished for 
being raped may fail to reveal that she has been raped until significant 
legal and psychological counseling have taken place. Her failure to do so 
from the time she first encounters a U.S. immigration official, however, 
may indicate to an adjudicator that she fabricated the rape, and thus harm 
her asylum claim.
c. Circumstances of Flight
The circumstances of an asylum applicant’s flight from his or her own 
country may also impact credibility. Upon entering the United States, 
most asylum applicants encounter uniformed, armed, sometimes curt 
government officials. Many applicants’ experiences with government 
officials have not been pleasant. Government officials may have been 
responsible for years of oppression, persecution and killings in 
applicants’ home countries. Some asylum seekers may have had to lie to 
government officials in the past to save their lives or avoid torture, or to 
prevent the persecution of friends, family, or colleagues. The impact of 
such experiences remains upon arrival at American gates. Certain asylum 
applicants may therefore lie or avoid revealing important details to 
government officials, especially those whom they meet upon first 
entering the country.193 They may also have the same initial mistrust of 
their lawyers, which may harm their ability to have effective 
representation. Both issues may harm their asylum claims.
2. Current Law on Credibility
a. Deference to Adjudicator: “Clearly Erroneous” Standard
of Review
Immigration judges’ credibility determinations receive a great deal of 
deference from reviewing courts.194 The Immigration and Nationality Act 
authorizes Courts of Appeals to reject an immigration judge’s credibility 
determination only if a “reasonable adjudicator would be compelled” to 
do so.195 Similarly, the Board of Immigration Appeals may only overturn 
an immigration judge’s credibility determination if the decision is 
192 See, e.g., Balasubramanrim v. INS, 143 F.3d 157, 161 (3d Cir. 1998).
193 See Children’s Guidelines, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 7 
(“Officers must be culturally sensitive to the fact that every asylum applicant is testifying 
in a foreign environment and may have had experiences which give him or her good reason 
to distrust persons in authority. . . . A fear of encounters with government officials in 
countries of origin may carry over to countries of reception.”).
194 Credibility determinations based on demeanor receive particular deference because 
of the immigration judge’s opportunity to observe the applicant’s testimony. See Singh-
Kaur v. INS, 183 F.3d 1147, 1149–51 (9th Cir. 1999) (affording great deference to 
credibility determination based on observation of demeanor); Kokkinis v. District Director, 
429 F.2d 938, 941–42 (2d Cir. 1970) (holding that “great weight” should be afforded to the 
adjudicator who conducted the hearing because he had the opportunity to observe the 
applicant’s demeanor); Matter of V-T-S-, 21 I&N Dec. 792, 796 (B.I.A. 1997) (recognizing 
that an immigration judge has the advantage of observing an applicant as he or she testifies).
195 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (2000).
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“clearly erroneous.”196 In practice, so long as an adverse credibility 
determination is based on more than bare speculation,197 the Courts of 
Appeals and the Board will generally uphold it.198
b. Inconsistencies and Omissions
An adverse credibility determination based on inconsistencies and 
omissions will pass the “clearly erroneous” test if based on evidence in 
the record. In Matter of A-S-,199 the Board of Immigration Appeals set out 
the criteria for determining whether an adverse credibility determination 
based on inconsistencies and omissions is supported by the record. First, 
the discrepancies and omissions must actually be present in the record.200
Second, the discrepancies and omissions must provide specific and 
cogent reasons to conclude that the applicant provided incredible 
testimony.201 Finally, the applicant must have had an opportunity to 
explain the discrepancies and omissions and must have failed to do so.202
Most Courts of Appeals have held that discrepancies and omissions that 
do not go to the heart of the claim are not an appropriate basis for an 
adverse credibility determination.203 In Uwase v. Ashcroft,204 for example, 
the immigration judge had denied asylum because the applicant, a 
survivor of the 1994 Rwandan genocide, provided inconsistent testimony 
regarding her means of supporting herself in the United States. The 
applicant’s student visa paperwork indicated that financial support for 
her stay in the United States would come from Rwanda; her testimony in 
196 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i) (2005).
197 See, e.g., Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 249 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc) (overturning 
an immigration judge’s credibility determination based on “speculation and conjecture”); 
Unase v. Ashcroft, 349 F.3d 1039, 1042 (7th Cir. 2003) (finding that an immigration judge’s
adverse credibility determination was unsupported by the record when the immigration judge 
relied on speculation and tenuous logic).
198 See Kalitani v. Ashcroft, 340 F.3d 1, 4–5 (1st Cir. 2003) (upholding an immigration 
judge’s credibility determination based upon discrepancies in the applicant’s testimony 
regarding who procured the documents allowing her to enter the United States, 
inconsistencies regarding the applicant’s identity, and perceived implausibility in the 
applicant’s account); Wu Biao Chen v. INS, 344 F.3d 272, 274–75 (2d Cir. 2003) 
(upholding an adverse credibility determination based on the applicant’s hesitant and 
unconvincing testimony as well as several inconsistencies in his testimony); Krouchevski 
v. Ashcroft, 344 F.3d 670, 673 (7th Cir. 2003) (finding that an applicant’s assertions that 
the inconsistencies present in his testimony were the result of translation errors and 
misunderstandings were insufficient to overcome the “clearly erroneous” standard of 
review); Matter of R-S-H-, 23 I&N Dec. 629, 637 (B.I.A. 2003) (upholding an 
immigration judge’s adverse credibility finding based on the “clearly erroneous” standard).
199 21 I&N Dec. 1106, 1110 (B.I.A. 1998) (noting that an individual fleeing 
persecution may have difficulty “remembering exact dates when testifying before an 
immigration judge”).
200 Id. at 1109.
201 Id.
202 Id.
203 See Kondakova v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 792, 796 (8th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 
S.Ct. 894 (2005) (“While minor inconsistencies and omissions will not support an adverse 
credibility determination, inconsistencies or omissions that relate to the basis of 
persecution are not minor but are at the heart of the asylum claim.”); Singh v. INS, 365 
F.3d 1164, 1171 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Minor inconsistencies in the record such as discrepancies 
in dates which reveal nothing about an asylum applicant’s fear for his safety are not an 
adequate basis for an adverse credibility finding.”) (quoting Vilorio-Lopez v. INS, 852 
F.2d 1137, 1142 (9th Cir. 1988)); see also Leia v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 427, 436 (3d Cir. 
2005); Sylla v. INS, 388 F.3d 924, 926 (6th Cir. 2004); Capric v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1075 
(7th Cir. 2004).204 349 F.3d 1039 (7th Cir. 2003).
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court, however, was that her father’s friend in the United States was 
supporting her.205 The Seventh Circuit held that, because the testimony 
regarding the facts of her asylum claim was credible, and that the 
testimony regarding her means of support did not go to the heart of her 
claim, the Board of Immigration Appeals was incorrect to sustain the 
immigration judge’s negative credibility determination.206 Requiring that 
inconsistencies go to the claim’s core is an important safeguard against 
unjust denials of asylum.
c. Airport Statements
Current regulations permit asylum adjudicators to take into account “any 
oral or written statement that is material and relevant to any issue in the 
case previously made by the respondent or any other person during any 
investigation, examination, hearing, or trial.”207 These include statements 
that U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement and U.S. Customs and 
Border Protection officers elicit from asylum applicants whom they 
apprehend attempting to enter the United States without proper 
documentation. As discussed in Section b, supra, such statements may 
contain discrepancies and omissions that become evident after an asylum 
applicant has submitted an asylum application and provided oral 
testimony.Some courts have recognized that, due to trauma and cultural differences, 
statements taken upon an asylum applicant’s entry into the United States 
may not be the most reliable indicators of credibility. In 
Balasubramanrim v. INS,208 the Third Circuit held that the immigration 
judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals placed undue weight on a 
statement provided by a Sri Lankan asylum applicant to immigration 
officers upon his arrival at JFK Airport in New York.209 The interview 
took place without a translator and the only record of the interview 
consisted of twenty-five hand-written questions and answers.210 During 
the interview, Mr. Balasubramanrim stated that he had been arrested by a 
Sri Lankan rebel group and detained for ten days.211 He did not mention 
any other arrest or mistreatment. In his asylum application, he listed 
eight incidents of arrest, several of which entailed physical violence and 
torture.212 The immigration judge and Board denied Balasubramanrim’s 
case, finding that the discrepancies between his airport statement and his 
subsequent written and oral testimony rendered him incredible. The 
Third Circuit reversed, holding that discrepancies in airport statements 
alone are an inappropriate basis for an adverse credibility 
determination.213As such, current case law on credibility suggests that a judge’s 
application denial, if based on inconsistencies and discrepancies “going 
to the heart of the claim,” will likely not be reversed as “clearly 
205 Id. at 1042–43.
206 Id.
207 8 C.F.R. § 1240.7(a) (2005).
208 143 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 1998).
209 Id. at 159–60.
210 Id. at 162.
211 Id.
212 Id. at 159.
213 Id. at 164.
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erroneous” unless those inconsistencies arose from an airport statement.
3. The Real ID Act’s Impact on Credibility Determinations
The Real ID Act codifies the long-established prescription that 
adjudicators weigh the totality of the circumstances when making 
credibility determinations.214 Yet, the Real ID Act departs from 
established case law regarding whether adjudicators should take into 
account minor inconsistencies and omissions by stating that immigration 
judges may base a credibility determination on, inter alia, 
inconsistencies, inaccuracies, or falsehoods “without regard to whether 
an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the 
applicant’s claim . . . .”215 As discussed in Section 2.b, supra, most 
circuits have held differently, as do as the INS Guidelines, which state 
that “[m]inor inconsistencies, misrepresentations, or concealment in a 
claim should not lead to a finding of incredibility where the 
inconsistency, misrepresentation or concealment is not material to the 
claim.”216Th s provision of the Real ID Act, however, is not a license to base a 
negative credibility finding in whole or in any significant part upon 
inconsistencies regarding immaterial facts. It merely permits immaterial 
inconsistencies to be considered as part of the totality of the 
circumstances.217 This is clear because the conference committee 
expressly rejected language in the House of Representatives version of 
the bill that would have allowed adjudicators to dispense with a reasoned 
totality of the circumstances analysis and make negative credibility 
determinations based on “any such factor, including . . . any inaccuracies 
or falsehoods . . . without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, 
or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim.”218
Therefore, the Real ID Act specifies that immaterial discrepancies should 
be factored in, but conclusively denies them controlling weight. Because 
the Real ID Act is otherwise silent on the weight of such factors, 
adjudicators should look to established case law, such as 
Balasubramanrim and In re A-S-, as well as the UNHCR Handbook, in 
deciding how much weight to give to discrepancies that do not go to the 
heart of the claim.219That being said, legislators should seriously consider repealing this 
portion of the Real ID Act. Permitting adjudicators to take into account 
minor inconsistencies that do not go to the heart of the claim will not 
prevent terrorism any better than the pre-Real ID system did. This is in 
part because the asylum system simply did not need strengthening.220
214 Real ID Act, Pub. L. No. 109-13, Div. B, § 101(a)(3)(B)(iii), 119 Stat. 231, 302–23 
(2005).
215 Id.
216 INS Supplementary Refugee/Asylum Adjudication Guidelines, reprinted in 67 
Interpreter Releases, 101–03 (Jan. 22, 1990).
217 See § 101(a)(3)(B)(iii), 119 Stat. at 303–04 (listing the numerous factors that 
adjudicators may consider while employing a “totality of the circumstances” analysis).
218 H.R. 418, 109th Cong. § 101(a)(3)(B)(iii) (2005) (emphasis added).
219 See 151 Cong. Rec. S4816, 4838 (daily ed. May 10, 2005) (statement of Sen. 
Brownback (R-Kan.)) (clarifying that in applying the Real ID Act, “[i]t would not be 
reasonable to find a lack of credibility based on inconsistencies, inaccuracies or falsehoods 
that do not go to the heart of the asylum claim without other evidence that the asylum 
applicant is attempting to deceive the trier of fact”).
220 See supra notes Error! Bookmark not defined.–Error! Bookmark not defined.
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One might argue that the absence of signs of successful abuse does not 
mean the system is perfect. Yet, even if the asylum system could be 
strengthened, the focus on minor inconsistencies would be an ineffective 
means of doing so; a terrorist bent on gaining access to lawful 
immigration status will likely not make mistakes in his or her asylum 
proceedings, but rather will be well-rehearsed and thoroughly coached.221
The focus on minor inconsistencies very well may, however, prevent 
bona fide asylum seekers from accessing the protection to which they are 
entitled by law and treaty. A bona fide asylum seeker, particularly one 
who has survived torture or other trauma, often will encounter or trigger 
the credibility issues discussed above. As a result, the provision will hurt 
bona fide asylum seekers without helping national security.
V. Implications for Special Cases Under the Real ID Act: Gender 
Asylum and Children’s Asylum Claims
The carelessness of the drafters of the Real ID Act is most evident with 
respect to gender-based asylum claims and the asylum claims of children. 
Women and especially children tend to be more at risk for persecution 
than adult males.222 Moreover, given that U.S. law enforcement officials 
focused their immediate post–September 11 investigative measures 
largely on males between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five, it is clear 
that the government recognizes that women and children are also the 
least likely to present a security risk to the United States.223 Yet, the 
drafters of the Real ID Act failed to distinguish gender-based and 
children’s asylum claims from general asylum claims. Although a full 
analysis of gender-based and children’s claims under the Real ID Act is 
beyond the scope of this Article, it is important to discuss briefly the 
potential impact that the Real ID Act may have on those claims.
A. Gender Claims
Gender claims generally involve women fleeing persecution stemming 
and accompanying text (discussing the failure of numerous terrorists to gain entry through 
the asylum process even under the more lax system in place before the pre-1996 reforms). 
See also 151 Cong. Rec. H453, 468 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 2005) (statement of Rep. Zoe 
Lofgren (D-Cal.)) (“[W]e have heard references to those who came prior to the first World 
Trade Center bombing. We made changes in the law subsequent to that. That fix has 
already been done. We do not need to do what is before us today.”); 151 Cong. Rec.
S4816, 4838 (daily ed. May 10, 2005) (statement of Sen. Brownback (R-Kan.)) (“[The 
Real ID Act’s] language was added based on a claim that our asylum system can be used 
by terrorists to enter the country. This is not the case.”).
221 See generally 9/11 and Terrorist Travel, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.
(detailing the modus operandi of foreign terrorists who have used subterfuge to enter and 
remain in the United States).
222 See Jonathan Todres, Women’s Rights and Children’s Rights: A Partnership with 
Benefits for Both, 10 Cardozo Women’s L.J. 603, 605 (2004) (noting that “political 
obstacles, such as not having the right to vote, and developmental issues, such as the more 
limited verbal skills of younger children, make children more susceptible to exploitation”). 
Professor Todres also identifies a number of practices to which women are vulnerable due 
to their gender, such as “domestic violence, incest, rape, trafficking and forced 
prostitution, child marriages, dowry-related violence, and female genital mutilation.” Id. at 
606.223 See Akram & Karmely, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 629–32 
(discussing several anti-terrorism measures that targeted almost exclusively Muslim and 
Arab males ages eighteen and older).
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from cultural, religious, and social subjugation and subordination. 
Examples include women who refuse to conform to their countries’ strict 
interpretation of Islamic law;224 women who have been subjected to or 
are in danger of being subjected to female genital mutilation;225 and 
women fleeing life-threatening domestic violence.226 Gender claims have 
had mixed results in the courts; the law, particularly with regard to 
claims based on domestic violence, is in a state of transition.227
The most challenging issue for gender-based asylum claims is proving 
that the motivation of the persecutor was one of the five grounds for 
asylum.228 This is particularly true for claims based on domestic violence, 
in which adjudicators often find that the persecution occurred at the 
hands of a single private actor on account of motivations not supported 
by the asylum statute.229 Thus, one might assume that the Real ID Act’s 
centrality provision would affect gender claims most. As discussed 
above, however, the centrality provision, although its language derives 
from the proposed gender regulations, does not much alter the extent to 
which an asylum applicant must prove the motivation of his or her 
persecutor. Therefore, the Real ID Act’s centrality provision appears 
neither to help nor to harm gender-based asylum applicants.
224 See, e.g., Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233 (3d Cir. 1993). Parastoo Fatin ºed Iran and 
sought asylum because of her beliefs in equal rights for women and her refusal to wear a 
veil as prescribed by Iranian law. Because of her views, Ms. Fatin faced a jail sentence or 
public whipping or stoning. Id. at 1236.
225 See, e.g., Matter of Kasinga, 21 I&N Dec. 357 (B.I.A. 1996). Fauziya Kasinga ºed 
from Togo to the United States to avoid being forced to submit to her tribe’s ritual of 
female genital mutilation. Id. at 358. The BIA overturned an immigration judge’s denial of 
asylum, finding that Ms. Kasinga belonged to a particular social group and qualified for 
asylum, even if the persecutors lacked malignant intent. Id. at 365.
226 See, e.g., Matter of R-A-, 22 I&N Dec. 906 (B.I.A. 1999). The applicant in Matter 
of R-A- was a Guatemalan woman named Rodi Alvarado, whose husband subjected her to 
severe abuse between 1984 and 1994. Her husband raped and sodomized her, “broke 
windows and mirrors with her head, dislocated her jaw,” pistol-whipped her, terrorized her 
with a machete, and kicked her violently in the spine while she was pregnant. Ms. 
Alvarado repeatedly attempted to flee her husband and to obtain protection, to no avail. 
The authorities “refused to intervene because it was a ‘domestic matter.’” Ms. Alvarado’s 
husband threatened to “cut off her arms and legs, and . . . leave her in a wheelchair, if she 
ever tried to leave him.” Id. at 908–10. See also Center for Gender and Refugee Studies, 
Rodi Alvarado’s Story, http://sierra.uchastings.edu/cgrs/campaigns/update.php (last visited 
Nov. 19, 2005).
227 See generally Leslye E. Orloff & Janice v. Kaguyutan, Offering a Helping Hand: 
Legal Protections for Battered Immigrant Women: A History of Legislative Responses, 10 
Am. U.J. Gender Soc. Pol’y & L. 95 (2001); Elizabeth M. Schneider, Battered Women and 
Feminist Lawmaking (2000). See also, e.g., Matter of R-A-, 22 I&N Dec. at 918 (reversing 
the immigration judge’s grant of asylum and holding that the social group consisting of 
“Guatemalan women who have been involved intimately with Guatemalan male 
companions who believe that women are to live under male domination” was not “recognized 
and understood to be a societal faction or otherwise a recognizable segment of the 
population”). As discussed in Part IV.A, supra, Attorney General Janet Reno issued 
proposed regulations recognizing gender-related persecution claims in 2000, but they have 
never become final. 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588 (proposed Dec. 7, 2000).
228 See Victoria Neilson, Homosexual or Female? Applying Gender-Based Asylum 
Jurisprudence to Lesbian Asylum Claims, 16 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 417, 422–25 (2005)
(discussing the problems women face in convincing courts that their persecution was based 
on a protected ground and, in particular, membership in a particular social group).
229 See Laura S. Adams, Fleeing the Family: A Domestic Violence Victim’s Particular 
Social Group, 49 Loy. L. Rev. 287, 287 (2003) (“[O]ne of the primary arguments against 
granting refugee status to domestic violence victims is that domestic violence is private in 
nature and therefore is not the type of politically motivated harm entitled to international 
protection under refugee law.”).
2006]                            Terrorism and Asylum Seekers                        133
The provision regarding credibility, however, may prejudice gender 
claims more than it harms non-gender claims. As discussed in Part IV.C, 
supra, cultural issues, past experiences with government officials, and 
trauma-related psychological ailments have a tremendous impact on 
credibility determinations. This impact is especially significant in many 
gender claims, in which cultural stigmas associated with disclosing 
incidents of rape, female genital mutilation, and domestic violence 
prevent many bona fide asylum applicants from being forthright about 
the persecution they suffered.230 Usually, victims of gender-based 
persecution must first receive psychological counseling and establish 
trusting relationships with their legal counsel before revealing their 
experiences fully.231 For many victims, however, particularly those in 
immigration detention, neither psychological nor legal counsel is 
available. Thus, the Real ID’s credibility provisions may result in the 
inappropriate denial of gender-based asylum claims.
The case of a woman from Albania provides an example of a victim of 
gender-based persecution for whom cultural differences had devastating 
consequences.232 The twenty-nine-year-old woman, whose name has been 
kept confidential per her request, was married at the age of sixteen by 
arrangement of her family. She lived with her husband’s family in the 
mountains of northern Albania, kept house, and tended livestock. When 
the Albanian communist regime ended, her husband took a job with the 
new authoritarian government. Eventually, southern Albanians rebelled 
against that regime. The woman’s husband, a government worker, fled 
into the mountains after several groups of armed supporters of the regime 
tried forcibly to recruit him to fight against the southern rebels. Shortly 
after he disappeared, a group of armed, masked men came to the house, 
separated the woman from the rest of the family, and gang-raped her.
Four days later, the woman fled to the United States with a false 
passport. U.S. officials took her into custody and placed her in a 
detention center. She received a credible fear interview with a female 
asylum officer, but the interpreter was an Albanian male and she was too 
embarrassed to describe the rape in front of him. The asylum officer 
found that the woman’s fear was not credible, and the woman appealed 
the decision to an immigration judge. During the hearing, the woman 
revealed that she had been raped. The immigration judge did not believe 
her, because she had not mentioned the rape in her credible fear 
interview. The woman was deported to Albania but could not return to 
her village and family because of the perceived shame and loss of honor 
resulting from the rape. Fortunately, a reporter from the New York Times
gave her case media attention, and her lawyers located a witness who 
could corroborate a portion of her claim. In a highly unusual turn of 
230 See Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Refugee Women at Risk: Unfair U.S. 
Laws Hurt Asylum Seekers 6 (2002).
231 Id. at 3–4.
232 Celia W. Dugger, In New Deportation Process, No Time, or Room, for Error, N.Y. 
Times, Sept. 20, 1997, at A1; Celia W. Dugger, Albanian Seeking Asylum Is Allowed to 
Return to U.S., N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 1998 at B5; see also Human Rights First, formerly 
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Is This America? The Denial of Due Process to 
Asylum Seekers in the United States (Oct. 2000), available at 
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/refugees/reports/due_process/due_process.htm (profiling 
the case of the Albanian woman).
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events, the U.S. government had her returned to the United States for a 
full asylum hearing.233
As this example shows, adjudicators of gender-based cases must be 
vigilant in deciding how much weight, if any, to give minor discrepancies 
and omissions, especially when those discrepancies and omissions are 
based on airport interviews. The risk, then, is that abuse of the Real ID 
Act’s more stringent credibility provision will greatly increase the 
number of victims of gender-based persecution who, like the woman 
from Albania, do not receive the refugee protection they deserve. The 
odds are that diligent reporters will not search for and fight for the return 
of those who are wrongfully deported due to officers’ unreasonable 
expectations of immediate and total candor.
B. Children’s Claims
Child asylum applicants stand to lose the most from the passage of the 
Real ID Act if adjudicators do not interpret it appropriately. The Real 
ID’s Act’s corroboration requirements and credibility criteria, if not 
applied more liberally to child asylum applicants, could result in many 
bona fide and eligible child asylum applicants having their claims 
denied. Such a result would be contrary to the United States’ obligations 
under the 1967 Protocol234 and the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights.235 It would also be far astray of the ideals espoused in 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child.236 Fortunately, the INS issued 
“Guidelines for Children’s Asylum Claims”237 that provide 
comprehensive guidance on adjudicating children’s claims. These 
guidelines can assist adjudicators in reading the Real ID Act consistently 
with the aforementioned international obligations. If adjudicators adhere 
to those guidelines faithfully, impact on children’s claims should be 
minimal.
1. The INS Guidelines for Children’s Asylum Claims
The Children’s Guidelines provide guidance to asylum officers on 
procedural matters, including interviewing techniques, factors affecting 
233 Dugger, Albanian Seeking Asylum Is Allowed to Return to U.S., supra note Error! 
Bookmark not defined..
234 See supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. and accompanying text.
235 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 UNTS 171 
(entered into force Mar. 23, 1976). Parties to the Covenant agree that “[e]very child shall 
have, without any discrimination as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, national or 
social origin, property or birth, the right to such measures of protection as are required by 
his status as a minor, on the part of his family, society and the State.” Id. art. 24(1).
236 G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/25 (Dec. 5, 1989) (entered into force Sept. 2, 
1990). The Convention on the Rights of the Child obligates parties to “take appropriate 
measures to ensure that a child who is seeking refugee status or who is considered a 
refugee in accordance with applicable international or domestic law and procedures shall, 
whether unaccompanied or accompanied by his or her parents or by any other person, 
receive appropriate protection and humanitarian assistance.” Id. art. 22(1). However, 
“because the U.S. has signed but not ratified the CRC, its provisions . . . provide guidance 
only and are not binding on adjudicators. Having signed the CRC, however, the United 
States is obligated under international treaty law to refrain from acts which would defeat 
the object and purpose of the Convention.” Children’s Guidelines, supra note Error! 
Bookmark not defined., at 2.
237 Children’s Guidelines, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined..
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credibility,238 and cross-cultural skills. The Children’s Guidelines also 
address in great detail the legal analysis of children’s asylum claims, 
including determining whether harm rises to the level of persecution, 
establishing nexus, and requiring corroborating evidence. The Children’s 
Guidelines emphasize that asylum officers must have special 
consideration for child asylum applicants in how they conduct the 
asylum interview,239 what expectations to have regarding testimony and 
corroboration, and how they evaluate the asylum claim.240 In developing 
this guidance, the INS relied on several international documents, 
including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,241 United Nations 
Executive Committee of the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees conclusions,242 UNHCR policies on refugee 
children,243 and Canadian children’s guidelines issued in 1996.244 The INS 
also consulted with UNHCR, U.S. nongovernmental organizations, and 
asylum and refugee experts while formulating the Children’s 
Guidelines.245 Therefore, they should be entitled to substantial weight in 
asylum proceedings.246
238 See id. at 9 (cautioning asylum officers to be vigilant for nonverbal indications of 
confusion and discomfort, such as “a puzzled look, knitted eyebrows, downcast eyes, long 
pauses and irrelevant responses”).
239 See id. at 7–9 (providing detailed suggestions for establishing a child-friendly 
atmosphere and building rapport with a child asylum applicant).
240 See id. at 14–27 (outlining the most appropriate factors and circumstances to 
consider and ask about).
241 Children’s Guidelines, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 2 (citing 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st 
plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948)).
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International Protection of Refugees, No. 47 (XXXVIII) on Refugee Children (1987) 
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Executive Committee of the UNHCR Programme, Conclusions on the International 
Protection of Refugees, No. 59 (XL) on Refugee Children (1989) (providing examples of 
how the needs of refugee children could be assessed, monitored, and met); and UNHCR, 
Executive Committee of the UNHCR Programme, Conclusions on the International 
Protection of Refugees, No. 84 (XLVIII) on Refugee Children and Adolescents (1997) 
(“reaffirming the ‘best interests of the child’ principle”)).
243 Children’s Guidelines, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 3–4 (citing 
UNHCR, Sub-Comm. of the Whole on Int’l Prot., Policy on Refugee Children, U.N. Doc. 
EC/SCP/82 (Aug. 6, 1993) (noting that refugee children have different needs and 
potentials than adults due to age-related developmental differences); UNHCR, Refugee 
Children: Guidelines on Protection and Care (1994) (incorporating international norms 
relevant to the protection and care of refugee children); and UNHCR, Guidelines on 
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246 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
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2. Centrality, Corroboration, and Credibility Under the
Children’s Guidelines
The Children’s Guidelines provide concrete guidance to judges on how to 
determine whether the persecutor of a child applicant was motivated by a 
protected ground. The Guidelines point out that “a child may express fear 
or have experienced harm without understanding the persecutor’s 
intent.”247 With regard to mixed motive cases, the Guidelines caution that 
“the child may be unable to identify all relevant motives, but a nexus can 
still be found if the objective circumstances support the child’s claim that 
the persecutor targeted the child based on one of the protected 
grounds.”248 This comports with the Real ID Act’s mandate that an 
applicant prove that a protected ground was at least one central reason 
for the persecution.249
The Children’s Guidelines are also essential to the proper evaluation of a 
child’s corroboration requirements under the Real ID Act. As discussed 
above, the drafters of the Real ID Act failed to impose an explicit 
reasonableness requirement on adjudicators with regard to when and how 
much corroborative evidence to require from asylum applicants.250
Nonetheless, adjudicators should follow the Children’s Guidelines 
suggestions on how to determine reasonably whether a child asylum 
applicant must corroborate his or her testimony. First, the Guidelines 
note that children “may lack the necessary documents to establish their 
race, nationality, or religion, and may have more limited access to these 
documents than a similarly situated adult. . . .”251 Second, the Guidelines 
remind adjudicators that credible, consistent, and sufficiently detailed 
testimony may obviate the need for corroboration, and that in 
determining whether the child’s testimony is sufficient to meet this 
standard, adjudicators should take into account the child’s age, maturity 
level, and emotional state.252 Third, the Guidelines instruct adjudicators 
to take into account whether the child has legal counsel and whether the 
child has been in contact with his or her family in determining whether to 
require corroboration.253Finally, the Guidelines provide essential guidance on determining 
whether a child asylum applicant is credible. The Guidelines advise that 
numerous indicators of unreliability may actually be the result of cultural 
differences, distrust of authority figures, and trauma.254 If asylum officers 
encounter vagueness, inconsistencies, inappropriate laughter, or 
hesitation, they must not assume unreliability but rather “remember the 
possible developmental or cultural reasons” that may have caused it.255
The Guidelines also warn that children are more susceptible to coercion 
by adults to tell a fabricated story, and advise adjudicators to explore the 
claim in depth, should a child begin to tell a seemingly fabricated 
247 Id. at 21.
248 Id.
249 See supra Part IV.A (analyzing the centrality provision of the Real ID Act).
250 See supra Part IV.B (analyzing the corroboration requirements of the Real ID Act).
251 Children’s Guidelines, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 22.
252 Id. at 26.
253 Id. at 27.
254 See supra Part IV.C.1 (discussing factors that may affect an adjudicator’s 
perception of an asylum applicant’s credibility).
255 Children’s Guidelines, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 14.
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story.256 These considerations continue to apply under the Real ID Act, 
which, as discussed in Part IV.C.3, supra, expressly adopted a totality of 
the circumstances test for determining credibility. Therefore, in several 
areas, the Children’s Guidelines offer pertinent and considered advice on 
the adjudication of children’s asylum claims.
VI. Conclusion
This Article has examined the recently enacted Real ID Act and has 
proposed interpretations of its three major asylum provisions. The 
analysis reveals that the Real ID Act is a codification—albeit a vague and 
poorly drafted one—of existing case law, regulations, and agency 
guidance. Despite the assertions of the Real ID Act’s supporters that the 
legislation is designed to repair a broken asylum system, the Real ID Act 
makes very few substantive changes to asylum law. Moreover, the 
changes that it does make will serve only to weaken the asylum system.
Applicants for asylum have always had the burden of proof that the Real 
ID Act reiterates: to prove that the persecution they suffered was on 
account of one of the five grounds for asylum; to provide corroborating 
evidence when it would be reasonable to expect it; and to establish 
credibility. The Real ID Act creates potentially dangerous ambiguity in 
these crucial areas of asylum law. That it does so in the name of 
protecting the United States from terrorists demonstrates a profound 
ignorance of the current asylum system and the protections against fraud 
and abuse already built into it.
Overall, the Real ID Act creates more problems and confusion than it 
purports to alleviate. Even more unfortunate is that it does so against a 
background of misconceptions about the asylum system and of misplaced 
wariness about asylum seekers. Fortunately, existing case law, 
international and agency guidelines, and simple common sense still have 
a vital role in asylum adjudications. Asylum adjudicators, as executors of 
the asylum laws and the treaties that generated them, have a duty to rely 
on these guiding principles in applying the Real ID Act to the claims that 
come before them. If they fulfill that duty, the damage that the Real ID 
Act does to the asylum system need not be extensive.
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